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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY       
 
Background 
In recognition of the role of illicit tobacco (IT) in undermining tobacco control strategies and 
in maintaining and encouraging tobacco use among deprived communities, the North of 
England Tackling Illicit Tobacco for Better Health Programme (the Programme) was 
launched in July 2009
1
. The main aim of this pilot Programme was to increase the health of 
the population in three regions (North West, North East and Yorkshire and Humber) through 
reducing smoking prevalence by (a) reducing the availability (supply) of IT, thus keeping real 
tobacco prices high; and (b) reducing the demand for IT by building on  existing tobacco 
control measures. Prior to the launch of this Programme, IT was largely the responsibility of 
the agency, Her Majesty‟s Revenue & Customs (HMRC), which focused predominantly on 
supply, so the Programme marked the first large-scale attempt of the health sector to reduce 
IT use.  
 
The UK Centre for Tobacco Control Studies (UKCTCS)
2
 was commissioned in September 
2009 to evaluate the Programme up until March 2011. The evaluation team was multi-
disciplinary and included researchers from the Universities of Nottingham, Durham 
(including researchers from FUSE
3
), Stirling, Northumbria and University College London.  
Methods 
The UKCTCS used a Theory of Change approach to the evaluation as the Programme was 
perceived to be a complex community initiative. A „mixed-methods‟ approach was utilised 
involving document analysis, qualitative research interviews, ethnographic research and 
examination of relevant quantitative indicators: including external ones (such as calls to 
Customs Hotline and Crimestoppers and a national survey of trading standards services 
carried out by Local Government Association) and from other studies commissioned by the 
Programme (such as surveys of stakeholders, Trading Standards and market research by The 
Hub and NEMS). As the Programme could not be expected to have an impact on prevalence 
during the evaluation period, indicators to assess supply and demand factors needed to be 
identified and monitored.  
Results 
Process evaluation 
It is important to take account of the context in which the Programme was operating between 
2009 and 2011 which included: the recession and the likelihood of it stimulating demand for 
IT products; the change of government and the resulting disruption to the financing and 
staffing of the Programme as well as the restructuring of public health at the local level from 
2010 onwards; the complex nature of the IT market which was dynamic and rapidly evolving; 
the government‟s freeze on all public health media campaigns. Collectively these factors can 
only have had a negative impact on the Programme.  
 
                                                          
1
 NoE Tackling Illicit Tobacco for Better Health Programme Action Plan 2009-2012. 
2
 UKCTCS, UK Centre for Tobacco Control Studies www.ukctcs.org  
3
 FUSE, the Centre for Translational Research www.fuse.ac.uk  
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The Programme was complex and multi-faceted and only key milestones in its development 
are described here. During the initial stages, the Programme devoted time to developing a 
logic model to identify and track the impact of eight objectives on activities and outputs. 
Together with the UKCTCS, key performance indicators were agreed. The first objective of 
the Programme and an underlying theme throughout the Programme‟s work was „partnership 
working‟. Much time and energy was devoted to this in the early stages, including 
establishing a multi-disciplinary Governance Board (GB) which involved key stakeholders 
from HMRC and Trading Standards, Health and Marketing across the three regions. Three 
regional steering groups were also set up, staff were appointed to key positions and funding 
was leveraged from external sources for additional posts. A website was set up to act as the 
communication vehicle for the Programme. The Programme also commissioned market 
research (from NEMS market research) to understand its target audience: who used IT and 
why. 
 
Stakeholder interviews enabled an understanding of the Theory of Change behind the 
Programme. They indicated that partnerships were developing well even at an early stage in 
the Programme‟s implementation and were identified as a key legacy of the Programme 
towards the end of the evaluation period. Nevertheless, issues were identified such as the 
ownership of the illicit tobacco issue, sharing of intelligence between local, regional and 
national enforcement bodies and the need for further development of the formal process for 
doing so.  The Programme played a key part in the negotiations around a revised protocol for 
sharing intelligence and closer working between the different enforcement bodies. This was 
thought to be critical and underpinned all of the Programme‟s work, for example if the 
Programme raised awareness of the dangers of IT use which resulted in intelligence 
forthcoming about local traders, this intelligence needed to be seen to be acted upon for the 
Programme to have continued credibility. Discussions around the revised protocol permeated 
the early interviews with stakeholders and later resulted in a decision to use the 
Crimestoppers hotline rather than the Customs Hotline for intelligence reporting by the GB, 
although HMRC continued to promote the Customs Hotline.  
 
A social marketing campaign. Get Some Answers (GSA), was developed to reduce demand 
for illicit tobacco, based on the Programme‟s research. This avoided discussion of relative 
health risks of illicit and licit tobacco (a strategy which had been used previously but which 
implies that licit tobacco is „healthier‟); instead, and for the first time in the UK, the 
Programme focused on aspects of criminality of illicit tobacco in local communities and the 
role it played in young people‟s smoking. The GSA campaign was only run in the North 
West (NW) and North East (NE) because of the Government freeze on media spend which 
affected Yorkshire and Humber (Y&H) which was solely funded by the Department of 
Health. The GSA campaign was implemented in June/July 2010 and again in 
January/February 2011 in the NW and NE regions.  
 
The Programme had a high profile throughout and was perceived by stakeholders to have 
significantly raised awareness of illicit tobacco among the relevant agencies and national 
policy makers as well as consumers. 
Outcome evaluation 
The selection of „higher-level‟ indicators to monitor supply and demand factors was not easy 
as it became apparent during the course of the evaluation that such indicators were not 
routinely collected and appraised. Without a control region, attributing any findings to the 
Programme is not possible. However we believe that all the indicators, from a variety of 
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sources, point towards the Programme having an impact on reducing demand and greater 
coordination of activities to reduce supply of IT in the region. 
The two websites set up by the Programme attracted a great deal of interest. Hits on the main 
Programme website (www.illicittobacconorth.org) totalled 17,578 from April 2010 to 
October 2011 including 12,844 new visitors. The GSA website (www.get-some-
answers.co.uk) received 16,038 hits from June 2010 to October 2011 including 12,991 new 
visitors; hits originated from 79 countries, but the vast majority emanated from the UK.  
Among participants in the stakeholder surveys, 52% in the second survey in 2011 indicated 
that IT had been a higher priority than a year ago, and 85% of these said that this was because 
of the influence of the Programme. Awareness of IT and related issues was perceived to have 
been raised across stakeholders. 
From the 2009 and 2011 NEMS surveys, the proportion of smokers who had brought back, or 
had others bring back, duty-free cigarettes from abroad fell substantially, from 33% and 27%, 
to 27% and 22%, respectively. The proportion of smokers purchasing IT also fell, from 20% 
to 18% and particularly among young smokers, as did the total market share of illicit tobacco, 
from 9.4% to 8.8%; this fall was more marked in the NE than in the NW. Awareness of IT 
among non-smokers increased from 54% to 69% and, importantly, the proportion of smokers 
who were comfortable with illicit fell, by four percentage points to 15%, with similar 
reductions recorded in both regions. The proportion „uncomfortable‟ with illicit tobacco rose 
by four percentage points to 59%. The proportion of people reporting that they were likely to 
report someone selling IT increased by three percentage points to 29%, 76% reporting that 
they would report sales to children (as in 2009). A survey of young people‟s (aged 14 to 17 
years) smoking behaviour by Trading Standards North West (TSNW) and NEMS data 
suggested a marked decrease in smoking among young people in the region.  
There was a clear impact of the GSA campaign on Crimestoppers calls in the NE and NW 
regions which increased from 100 in the period April 2009 to March 2010 to 328 for the year 
April 2010 to March 2011 during which the campaign ran; calls in Y&H which did not run 
the GSA campaign fell from 33 to 19 across the two periods. Calls to Crimestoppers dropped 
off from April 2011 across the region onwards suggesting that the social marketing campaign 
would need to be continued to have a sustainable large effect. Calls to the Customs Hotline 
have increased steadily across the three regions during the evaluation period.  
In summary, all of the selected indicators moved in a direction indicating that the Programme 
has played a key role in reducing the supply of IT and demand for it.  
Key learning points  
 The Programme was unique and very ambitious, endeavouring to tackle a complex and 
difficult issue which hitherto had almost predominantly been focused on reducing supply; 
the Programme also endeavoured to tackle demand for IT. Complexities were also 
brought about by the multidisciplinary nature of the partnerships involved, bringing 
together agencies that previously had not worked closely together and operated across 
three diverse regions in the North of England.  
 The Programme has not been immune from the devastating cuts in funding during the 
period under review; however the government's preoccupation with revenue has helped 
shield this area from some of the cuts to other health programmes. 
 The Programme‟s strategy was very comprehensive and logical; the GB developed a clear 
set of activities with pathways identified to reach the intended outcomes. 
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 No agreed indicators exist for assessing the supply and demand of IT at a local level and 
relevant data are not routinely collected nor readily available for study. For the future, we 
recommend routine electronic monitoring for any IT actions being carried out by local 
authorities. At a national level HMRC estimates the size of the market annually, based on 
General Lifestyle Survey data of smoking prevalence against revenue receipts for the sale 
of licit tobacco products. 
 There is no doubt that the profile and importance of IT as an issue has been raised 
(several indicators point favourably in this direction and among a range of national, 
regional and local stakeholders, professionals and consumers). This, we believe is 
testament to the noticeable effort the Programme went to understand the target audience 
and disseminate findings and materials widely across the region. 
 The Programme successfully avoided using messages around the relative harms of IT, 
instead focusing on criminality in local communities and the influence of IT on children‟s 
smoking. Addressing illicit tobacco is very difficult, particularly during a recession, as 
this requires a sensitive approach addressing very complex relationships within 
communities around smoking (such as local suppliers being seen as „Robin Hood‟ 
characters but also a fear of reporting some dealers) which require „buy-in‟ from frontline 
community and health workers. Whilst not all those observed were confident about 
focusing on criminality, the messaging generally had resonance with frontline workers 
and the research indicates that these messages have had some traction with the public. 
 The indicators show that despite the recession, intelligence calls increased and reported 
demand for IT products has fallen during the lifetime of the Programme to date.  
 The Programme brought together diverse stakeholders with what were initially very 
different philosophies/worldviews and priorities.  Over time, these disparities have been 
partially ironed out such that it is now possible to see all stakeholders as sharing some 
more universal meta-values, such as health and the reduction of social harm (especially 
harm to children). Greater involvement of some professional groups such as the police 
could be beneficial in the future. 
 A significant success of the Programme was to overcome many structural barriers to 
sharing intelligence, such as a legislative and policy context that was extremely restrictive 
of data sharing. The Programme successfully supported negotiations for on-going joint 
working that seemed to represent new levels of collaboration between enforcement 
agencies. All stakeholders interviewed reported a much better understanding of the 
remits, resources and areas of action of other agencies involved.  
 By encouraging dialogue and joint working, these partnerships have also helped to raise 
the profile of tobacco control as a whole, thereby partially overcoming complacency after 
the implementation of the smoke free legislation in 2007. On the enforcement side, this 
joint working has also contributed to other work around age-of-sale, illicit alcohol and 
counterfeit goods. 
 The Programme used its budget to leverage other funds, thereby increasing investment in 
the issue of IT beyond the confines of the Programme‟s fixed-term budget. 
 The Programme had a high profile regionally, nationally and internationally, and was 
highlighted in various Government documents during the evaluation period. 
 The Programme provides a blueprint for tackling the issue which was utilised by other 
regions and by the government pilot projects which utilised the Programme‟s imagery and 
ideas.  
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Conclusions 
Despite the recession and significant disruption and cuts to staff and resources, all the 
available indicators show an increase in intelligence reports to the hotlines during the 
campaign period and promising reductions in demand for IT which are likely attributable to 
the Programme. It should be noted however that this innovative and unique pilot Programme, 
tackling a complex region-wide issue, is still at a relatively early stage of implementation and 
therefore this evaluation should be seen in that context. 
The sustainability of the Programme is likely to rest on continued investment.  This is 
necessary to enable: ongoing regional coordination; regular meetings of stakeholders to 
enable expertise and intelligence to be shared; a sustained social marketing campaign; and 
progress to be monitored. In moving forward, the Programme should continue to assess 
consumer views. As the recession continues, striking the right balance between avoiding a 
focus on tax losses and relative health risks, whilst concentrating on criminality and the 
influence of IT on children will require vigilance. The Programme trialled a new approach to 
this which appears to have had resonance with the target audience and the materials have 
been utilised and further developed by other pilot projects in other areas.  
Illicit tobacco remains a serious and significant 'upstream' problem affecting health 
inequalities in countries worldwide.  There is also evidence of continued collusion in illicit 
tobacco by the tobacco industry
4
. The Programme offers a blueprint for regional initiatives to 
reduce both the supply and demand for illicit tobacco; it is an exemplar of partnership 
working which is thought to be unique and deserves to be widely disseminated.  
2.  INTRODUCTION          
 
The importance of tackling illicit tobacco 
Smoking is the leading cause of preventable mortality and morbidity in the UK. Evidence-
based tobacco control policies, in particular increased taxes, reduce smoking prevalence yet 
such policies are significantly undermined by the use of illicit tobacco. Illicit tobacco use is 
more common among socio-economically disadvantaged groups and hence exacerbates 
health inequalities as “it maintains smokers in their habit and encourages young people to 
start smoking”5. The prevalence of illicit tobacco is particularly worrying in disadvantaged 
communities, where “cheap” tobacco is often seen as a “bargain” and people have 
traditionally seen those involved in the “illicit” trade as latter-day „Robin Hoods‟6.  
Illicit tobacco use includes smuggled tobacco, bootlegged and counterfeit tobacco
7
. Within 
the UK, the latest figures indicate that approximately 10% of cigarettes and 46% of hand 
rolling tobacco are smuggled and tobacco fraud costs taxpayers around £2 billion per annum.
8
 
Traditionally, responsibility for tackling illicit tobacco has resided within the agency that is 
now known as Her Majesty‟s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) whose key endeavour is to 
                                                          
4
 Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) report: Big trouble at Big Tobacco is available 
at:   http://www.reportingproject.net/ 
5
 NoE Tackling Illicit Tobacco for Better Health Programme Action Plan 2009-2012. 
6
 Wiltshire S, Bancroft A, Amos A, Parry O. “They‟re doing people a service”: qualitative study of smoking, 
smuggling and social deprivation‟. British Medical Journal, 2001; 23: 203–7. 
7
 NoE Tackling Illicit Tobacco for Better Health Programme Action Plan 2009-2012. 
8
 HMRC. Measuring tax gaps 2011. September 2011. 
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ensure that appropriate duty on tobacco products is paid. Illicit tobacco therefore implies a 
significant loss of revenue for the Exchequer.  
There were concerns about illicit tobacco use in all three North of England regions (North 
East, North West and Yorkshire and Humber) where there was evidence of a high incidence 
of smoking, “with some deprived wards in the North having a smoking prevalence of over 
50%”9. Illicit tobacco is a significant problem particularly in the North of England, which is 
considered a “hotspot” due to its high levels of smoking prevalence and low levels of income.  
Brief history, context, and aims of the Programme 
The seeds of the North of England Tackling Illicit Tobacco for Better Health Programme (the 
Programme) were planted in December 2007, when Fresh Smoke Free North East (SFNE) 
hosted the North of England Summit on Smuggled and Counterfeit Tobacco, a one-day event 
co-organised with Smoke Free North West (SFNW – renamed Tobacco Free Futures from 
October 2011), Smoke Free Yorkshire and Humber (SFY&H), and HM Revenue & Customs 
(HMRC). This summit was the first time that a number of interested UK agencies with 
distinct remits and strategic priorities had gathered together to discuss and share knowledge 
on the topic of illicit tobacco (IT). About 200 people were in attendance, with good 
representation from health organisations, HMRC, and Trading Standards (TS). At this event, 
several representatives from health and enforcement organisations, local authorities, non-
governmental organisations (eg ASH) and academia gave presentations regarding IT, and key 
issues were discussed and debated in workshops. The Programme‟s vision and objectives 
emanated largely from the development of these original discussions, paired with the review 
of relevant research. 
A further process of consultation took place between June and September 2008, which 
included the participation of the three Regional Tobacco Policy Managers (RTPM) for the 
North of England, and colleagues from the Department of Health (DH), HMRC, the UK 
Border Agency (UKBA), Local Authorities (LA), TS, the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) and the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). A consultant was 
hired to turn the outcomes of discussions into an Action Plan and from this came the eight 
Programme Objectives (see below) and the North of England (NoE) Tackling Illicit Tobacco 
for Better Health Programme Action Plan emerged
10
.  
The formal public facing launch of the Programme was on 27
th
 July 2009. The Programme, 
which was originally pump-primed by a grant from DH and covers the three North of 
England (NoE) regions, supports the DH National Tobacco Strategy, the HMRC Tackling 
Tobacco Smuggling Strategy and the joint DH/ HMRC Illicit Tobacco Marketing Strategy. 
The main aim of the Programme was to increase the health of the population in all three 
regions of the North of England through reducing smoking prevalence by (a) reducing the 
availability (supply) of illicit tobacco, thus keeping real tobacco prices high; and (b) reducing 
the demand for illicit tobacco by building on  existing tobacco control measures. It aimed to 
raise awareness of the issue of illicit tobacco, to engage with relevant health and community 
workers, and to develop infrastructure to aid information sharing, identification of illicit 
markets, and enforcement action. The Programme intended to achieve the above broad aims 
through an effort of concerted action between health and enforcement agencies in the three 
northern regions. The Programme was the first real attempt by the health sector to develop 
activities to tackle illicit tobacco use.  
                                                          
9
 NoE Tackling Illicit Tobacco for Better Health Programme Action Plan 2009-2012. 
10
 NoE Tackling Illicit Tobacco for Better Health Programme Action Plan 2009-2012. 
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Background and aims of the evaluation 
This evaluation of the Programme was undertaken by the UK Centre for Tobacco Control 
Studies (UKCTCS), commissioned in September 2009. The evaluation team was led by Prof 
Ann McNeill at the UKCTCS, University of Nottingham.  Academics from the Smoking 
Interest Group (SIG) at Durham University, led by Drs Andrew Russell and Sue Lewis, were 
in charge of the ethnographic strand, supervising research associates Drs Serena Heckler and 
Susana Carro-Ripalda. SIG is an affiliate of FUSE, the Centre for Translational Research in 
Public Health, which is based in the North East (NE).  Other colleagues at the University of 
Nottingham (Dr Manpreet Bains and Prof John Britton), University College London (Belinda 
Iringe-Koko and Dr Andy McEwen), University of Stirling (Prof Linda Bauld and Dr Doug 
Eadie) and the University of Northumbria (Dr Rob Hornsby) were also involved. The period 
of the work of the Programme that was evaluated fell between September 2009 and March 
2011 except where indicated. 
The UKCTCS believed that the Programme constituted a „complex community initiative‟ as 
it aimed to promote positive changes among different groups and at different levels. The 
evaluation of complex community initiatives is not straightforward and doesn‟t lend itself 
easily to experimental designs such as randomised controlled experiments. A further 
complexity was that the Programme operated across three regions of England which differed 
not only in size but in regional and local organisational structures and each region was 
therefore unlikely to implement the Programme in the same way.  
The Governance Board (GB) requested that both a process- and outcome-oriented evaluation 
be considered. After the first Programme Manager was hired, the principles underlying this 
complex intervention were laid out by him in a Logic Model
11
. The Logic Model illustrated 
the logical relationships that the stakeholders believed existed between the inputs of the 
Programme (the resources), the activities the Programme undertook and the changes or 
benefits that resulted from it. The GB had developed some draft Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) for the individual activities which they wished to agree upon and then monitor which 
the UKCTCS appraised (Annex 1 available on request). Figure 1 shows a summary of the 
Logic Model as applied to the Programme, together with the draft KPIs as developed by the 
GB as at October 2009.  
Figure 1 Logic Model for the North of England Programme 
                                                          
11
 NoE Tackling Illicit Tobacco for Better Health Programme Action Plan 2009-2012. 
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The UKCTCS proposed a „Theory of Change‟ approach to the evaluation of the 
Programme
12
. This was defined as a „systematic and cumulative study of the links between 
activities, outcomes and contexts of an initiative‟13. Put more simply, the approach was about 
building a theory of how and why a project was supposed to work.  This approach sat well 
alongside the Logic Model that had been used to develop the Programme. 
As the overall aim of this Programme was to have an impact on smoking prevalence through 
reducing the supply and demand for illicit tobacco in the North of England (long term 
outcomes), it was important to identify how these outcomes were to be measured. It was 
recognized that in the lifetime of this evaluation it would not be possible to measure changes 
in prevalence because of the delay in the publication of prevalence data (a time lag of around 
two years). So assessing reductions in supply and demand would be the important outcomes 
to measure. However, to be of maximum value the evaluation needed to identify factors that 
played a role in the overall impact, so would need to identify those activities which worked 
well and contributed positively to the overall impact, and those that worked less well or made 
little contribution, and why. This would also be important learning for future development of 
the Programme (beyond year two) as well as for those seeking to replicate the Programme 
elsewhere. To do this, we needed to understand the links between the activities and the longer 
term outcomes as illustrated in the figure above.  
                                                          
12
 Evaluating the North of England Illicit Tobacco Programme, UKCTCS, September 2009. 
13
 Connell, J.P. & Kubisch, A.C. (1998) Applying a theory of change approach to the evaluation of 
comprehensive community initiatives: progress, prospects, and problems. In: Fulbright-Anderson et al. (eds) 
New Approaches to Evaluating Community Initiatives, Vol. 2: Theory, Measurement, and Analysis 
(Washington, DC, Aspen Institute). 
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In addition, we realised that, because many of the activities - such as building effective local 
partnerships - would be hard to assess quantitatively, qualitative research was required to 
supplement some of the KPIs to give a richer and more narrative description. Our approach 
was therefore to use a mixture of quantitative and qualitative research and would include 
what we refer to as an “ethnographic strand”. A brief outline of our approach to the 
evaluation is given below; our methods are described in Section 3.  
Our evaluation 
A Theory of Change approach to evaluation 
As stated above, we suggested using a Theory of Change approach to the evaluation.  The 
assumptions involved in the Programme were „articulated‟ through document analysis and 
the qualitative research interviews and was then explored through the ethnographic research. 
Assumptions are the beliefs, principles and ideas about the programme and how it is 
envisaged to work, taking into account the environment and the participants. The programme 
consists of eight objectives: Developing partnerships; Engaging health and community 
workers; Generating and sharing intelligence; Identifying informal markets and preventive 
action; Deliver enforcement; Marketing and communications; Working with businesses; and, 
Assessing progress. For each objective, the Programme identified specific outputs and 
outcomes that support the aims using the Logic Model approach.  
The Theory of Change was to be developed to explain why these projects were selected and 
how they were envisaged to contribute to the overall aim. To some extent this might appear 
self-evident but it is likely that the assumptions underpinning particular activities and 
expected outcomes will differ between stakeholders and it is important that these links be 
clearly articulated at the outset.  
Interviews with stakeholders 
Our first step was therefore to carry out in-depth interviews with the membership of the GB 
to get an overview of their expectations of the programme and the Theories of Change they 
thought applied to the Programme‟s Projects. These interviews also provided a rich narrative 
of their understanding of the Programme and what factors they saw as important to the 
Programme‟s success.  
Towards the end of the evaluation period, we conducted repeat interviews with some of the 
same people interviewed at the outset and also interviewed a handful of external stakeholders. 
These interviews were to assess how the thinking of the key stakeholders had evolved or 
changed during the two years of implementation and assess outside perceptions about the 
Programme.  
Monitoring long term outcomes and ‘Higher Level Indicators’ 
We proposed that ideally the evaluation needed to take into account the aim of the 
Programme. However, this could not be measured during the evaluation period (as stated 
above because of the time lag involved in the publication of prevalence data) but also because 
the Programme could not be expected to achieve a reduction in smoking prevalence in the 
short term. Given that the Programme aimed to reduce smoking: ‘through reducing the 
supply and demand for illicit tobacco in the North of England’, it was therefore critically 
important to monitor supply and demand for illicit tobacco yet there were no agreed and 
accepted measures for doing this. One of the challenges of the evaluation was therefore to 
identify how best to measure supply and demand, complicated by the fact that these are inter-
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related. We refer to these indicators as Higher Level Indicators, and we prepared a briefing 
for the GB on the options for measuring supply and demand (Annex 2 available on request). 
This involved assessing the availability of routine data and how these could best be accessed 
before recommending which indicators to monitor. The evaluation team‟s resources limited 
their ability to commission new research and so the evaluation was largely reliant on using 
existing sources of data. 
Tracking progress  
Whilst tracking the KPIs was the responsibility of the GB, the evaluation team identified and 
supported the development of these KPIs and through the ethnographic evaluation (see 
below) broadly assessed the progress for each objective and whether the intended 
consequences/outcomes were achieved.  Again, whilst it would have been useful to get fine 
grained information on, for example, attitudes of pub landlords to the sale of illicit tobacco on 
their premises, retailers concerning the sale of „below the counter‟ illicit tobacco, hauliers, ice 
cream van companies, etc., commissioning new research was not possible within the budget 
of the evaluation.  Methods of working across the Programme and the three Regions were 
also tracked. This was important for understanding any differences in implementation across 
the Regions as well as why planned projects and activities may have differed from their 
implementation. Unintended outcomes would also be anticipated and measured. 
Rationale of the ethnographic evaluation 
The ethnographic research team used their experience of embedded and action research
14,15,16
 
to carry out collaborative ethnographic research with the primary objective of elucidating 
gaps in the research undertaken by the other members of the evaluation team and to give a 
richer and more narrative description. The ethnographic strand of the evaluation has in part 
followed the eight Programme objectives and their associated activities. However, and after 
consultation with stakeholders, a specific set of research questions was set for the 
ethnographic evaluation. These questions were: 
1. Is effective partnership working occurring? 
2. What are the organisational and operational differences between the regions? 
3. How is the programme working at the sub-regional level? Are its aims and 
justification clear? Is the Programme seen as successful? 
 
Throughout the evaluation, the answers to these questions have been incorporated into the 
relevant sections.  
3. METHODS OF THE EVALUATION      
    
Understanding the context of the Programme  
A key part of the evaluation was the need to understand the local, regional, national and 
international context in which the Programme was running. This was done through document 
analysis and interviews. 
                                                          
14
 Reason, P and H. Bradbury (eds) Handbook of Action Research: Participative Inquiry in Practice.  London: 
Sage, 2001. 
15
 Huxham, C and S. Vangen Researching Organizational Practice through Action Research: Case Studies and 
Design Choices.  Organizational Research Methods, 6(3): 383-403; 2003. 
16
 Lewis, S. and A. Russell, Being Embedded: a Way Forward for Ethnographic Research.  Ethnography, 12(3): 
398-416; 2011. 
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Primary research carried out by the evaluation team 
Stakeholder interviews I and II 
‘Baseline’ Stakeholder interviews I 
The Theory of Change places great importance in stakeholders‟ assumptions, therefore in-
depth, semi-structured interviews of key stakeholders in the Programme were carried out to 
get an overview of their expectations and understanding of the Programme.  
Specifically, we were interested in finding out about: 
 Stakeholders‟ prior involvement with, and amount of time currently spent on, illicit 
tobacco 
 Expected impact, and anticipated problems, of the Programme at the beginning of 
stakeholder involvement 
 The reasons for stakeholders becoming involved and expectations of the Programme 
 Current knowledge of the Programme and its objectives and the role stakeholders play 
within it 
 Stakeholders‟ views on progress to date and how they think the Programme should 
develop 
The interviews took place in November and December 2009, approximately six months after 
the public launch of the Programme. 
Participants 
It was recognised that the Programme has a large and varied number of stakeholders, but 
members of the Programme GB (16 stakeholders) were considered to be key and were 
therefore the focus of this evaluation. The GB consisted of representatives from local and 
national enforcement agencies, representatives from the regional health agencies and 
marketing and communication professionals. GB members were invited to attend an 
interview by email and all agreed.  Fifteen interviews were conducted face-to-face at the 
workplaces of the stakeholders, four were conducted before and after a steering group 
meeting at another venue, and one of the interviews was conducted over the telephone. 
 Data collection 
Semi-structured interviews were used to enable interviewees to talk about a particular area in 
detail and allow for areas to be explored that the interviewer had no prior knowledge of. The 
interview schedule focused on stakeholders‟ perceptions of the Programme, their knowledge 
and understanding of the Programme, their roles within the Programme, thoughts on the 
Programme‟s progress and finally their views on the future of the Programme. All interviews 
were recorded using a digital audio recording device. On average, the interviews lasted 45 
minutes (range: 30-74 minutes).  
Data Analysis 
All interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed thematically using the framework 
approach to qualitative analysis
17
. First, the interviewer cleaned the data to remove any 
identifiers and ensured that the transcripts were accurate representations of the audio 
recordings. The transcripts were then examined to determine important core themes based on 
a priori and emergent issues. These themes were then applied to all transcripts in order to 
                                                          
17
 Ritchie J, Spencer l. Qualitative data analysis for applied policy research in: A. Bryman & R.G. Burgess (eds) 
Analyzing Qualitative Data. London: Routledge, 1994.  
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further develop and refine them. This was done by lifting data from their original context and 
arranging them under the appropriate thematic references, developing new themes as 
appropriate. The various themes and issues observed from the interview data were then 
grouped into a smaller number of main themes and placed in a framework. Analysis of the 
data was primarily conducted by one researcher and then second coded to enhance validity by 
another researcher. Quotes are placed where relevant in this report. To maintain anonymity, 
quotes are followed by the category of organisation to which the quote belongs.   
Stakeholder interviews II 
These interviews took place one year later in November and December 2010. 
Participants 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 14 individuals between November and 
December 2010.  The sample comprised of nine stakeholders from the Programme GB, 
representing local and national enforcement agencies, regional and national health agencies 
and marketing and communications. Additionally, five individuals who were external to the 
Programme, but had some awareness of the initiative were also interviewed; these individuals 
came from regional and national health and local government agencies and two non-
governmental organisations working in the UK.   
Data Collection and Analysis 
As with the first interviews, a semi-structured interview guide was developed which in this 
instance comprised of prompts which sought to explore the main strengths and weaknesses of 
the Programme and also covered the opportunities and threats, in terms of the future of the 
initiative.  Interviews were conducted either face-to-face at the participant‟s place of work or 
via telephone in a private office and were digitally audio-recorded.  Interviews lasted between 
25 and 60 minutes.  Interviews were transcribed externally, cleaned and analysed as above.  
On this occasion each transcript was read several times, where initial codes were noted each 
time, prior to using NVivo 8 (QSR International Ltd, Melbourne, Australia) as a data 
management tool.   
Ethnographic evaluation 
The main methods used to gather data for the ethnographic evaluation were as follows and 
additionally focused on two small localities for in-depth research: 
1. Participant observation 
2. Informal and semi-structured interviews 
3. An analysis of other pieces of research commissioned by the Programme and related 
programmes 
4. An analysis of documents, emails and other forms of written communication prepared 
for and by Programme stakeholders 
5. An analysis of documents, research, websites and communication by other 
organisations and researchers on the topic of illicit tobacco or related topics.  
 
It is also important to note that ethnographic research methods have evolved and adapted to 
changing circumstances during the course of the evaluation, as it is common in this type of 
qualitative research methodology.  
 
Analysis involved reviewing and coding by themes the information contained in each of the 
sources. These themes were then cross-checked with other data sources to identify important 
and emergent meta-themes, to draw causal links and to highlight issues which might not have 
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been rendered visible by quantitative instruments. In this way, a mass of data was collected, 
analysed, triangulated and collated to form a well-rounded, detailed and rigorous overview of 
the Programme from its inception until March 2011. 
 
Identifying KPIs and Higher Level Indicators 
As discussed above, the evaluation team appraised the Programme‟s KPIs and made 
recommendations for those which the GB should monitor. The evaluation team also prepared 
a list of potential Higher Level Indicators which was discussed by the GB and decisions were 
taken as to which the UKCTCS should monitor. Some of these sources are discussed in more 
detail below.  
Programme commissioned research and external data 
As discussed earlier, the Programme was largely reliant on evaluation existing data. Efforts 
were therefore made to assess the findings of Programme commissioned research.  
Peppermint research 
The Programme made considerable efforts to understand their target audience. A research 
company, Peppermint, was commissioned during the early development of the Programme, 
before the Programme was launched and the evaluation began. Using in depth research in 
different areas, attempts were made to understand smokers‟ relationships with illicit tobacco. 
This research identified misconceptions and myths about illicit tobacco and sellers that 
needed to be addressed in order to challenge assumptions made by smokers about what they 
were smoking and who was ultimately responsible for illicit tobacco sales. It was anticipated 
that unpicking some of these misconceptions could be the tipping point for some smokers and 
result in quit attempts. This study also identified some possible communication routes for 
marketing campaigns on illicit tobacco.  
NEMS 
A survey of over 6000 people surveyed across the three regions by telephone or street 
interviews, was carried out by NEMS market research company in July 2009. This was 
repeated in 2011 in the NW and NE regions only (with similar regional sample sizes as 
previously). The methodology for this research is described in the results section for ease of 
comprehension. 
Trading standards NW surveys 
Trading Standards North West carry out a regular survey of nearly 14,000 14-16 year olds in 
the North West region. During the Programme, two surveys were carried out: in 2009 and 
2011. The surveys followed similar methodologies and used similar questionnaires to enable 
the results to be compared. Questionnaires were distributed to young people via schools for 
completion and return.  
Online stakeholder surveys 
Two online surveys of a wide group of stakeholders took place, carried out by Porter Novelli; 
the first was implemented out in May/June 2009 with 497 participants (it was not made clear 
how many stakeholders were approached); the second in October/November 2010 with 346 
participants (again the number approached was not given). Participants consisted of Primary 
Care Trusts (PCTs), Local Authorities (LAs) and others to gauge their prioritisation of illicit 
tobacco and any activities concerning illicit tobacco that they were involved in.  
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Trading standards survey 
This questionnaire survey was implemented in March 2009 by the inaugural Programme 
Manager and assessed the tobacco related priorities of Local Area Chief Officers via Trading 
Standard leads.  
Customs Hotline data 
HMRC provided Customs Hotline data for 2007 to 2011. There are several caveats which we 
were requested to take into account with these data: the data refer only to intelligence where 
HMRC received a correct postcode and therefore do not include non-geographic and frontier-
related intelligence; the data do not relate to results, only allegations received; and the data 
may also contain some duplicates where HMRC received multiple pieces of intelligence on 
one subject. 
Crimestoppers data 
Crimestoppers and regional Trading Standards contacts provided relevant data from 2009 to 
2011. There are also a few caveats in relation to these data:  Local Authority boundaries are 
not immediately identifiable from the partial postcode data. For example, „BB‟ relates to 
Blackburn, but also areas of Lancashire; Salford has Manchester postcodes and most areas of 
Rochdale have Oldham postcodes but some have „M‟ postcodes. Secondly, where a 
Crimestoppers report makes reference to several addresses, all addresses identifiable have 
been mapped in the data so the total number column will exceed the total number of reports 
sent into the region by Crimestoppers.  
Website hits 
Hits to the two websites used by the Programme (see below) were provided to the evaluation 
team by the Programme staff. 
Trading Standards data 
The evaluation sought to analyse data on illicit tobacco from trading standards services in 
councils
18
. However, there were gaps in the data that councils were able to supply. An 
alternative source of data was therefore sought. The Local Government Association (LGA) 
and the Department of Health (DH) undertake an annual tobacco control survey
19
; this survey 
contains data on illicit tobacco.  
Permission was sought to obtain data for the North of England regions (the NE, the NW and 
Y&H) on illicit tobacco from the most recent survey (for the financial year 2010-2011). 
Ninety two per cent of respondents to the tobacco control survey in the North of England (46 
out of 50) gave permission to use their data. These 46 councils equate to nearly one third of 
the total number of councils with trading standards services in England.  
These data were then analysed examining the results of the LGA survey, alongside the results 
of a regional analysis for the North of England that the evaluation team undertook of the 46 
councils that agreed to share data.  
                                                          
18 Councils with trading standards services are located in single tier and county councils only; there 
are 201 district councils in England who don't undertake this type of work. 
19 Available at: http://www.lacors.gov.uk/lacors/ContentDetails.aspx?id=25141  
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4. RESULTS          
 
(i) Context in which the Programme was operating 
In this section we discuss some important developments that were happening outside of the 
Programme but which nevertheless would have a significant impact on the Programme‟s 
development. On the whole we believe that these factors collectively would have a negative 
impact on the Programme and its implementation either because they affected the 
Programme‟s infrastructure, staff, and/or resources or were a direct influence on smokers. We 
discuss these issues briefly here to give an overall context to the Programme, but some are 
discussed in more detail in later sections.   
An evolving illicit tobacco  market 
The UK government has introduced strategies and agreements to reduce the supply of illicit 
tobacco. In 2000, the government introduced a new comprehensive strategy Tackling 
Tobacco Smuggling
20
, which was updated and expanded in 2006
21
 and again in 2008
22
 and 
2011
23
. Legally binding agreements are now in place between the UK Government and 
tobacco companies on reducing illicit tobacco smuggling. During the course of our evaluation 
the announcement was made that British American Tobacco (BAT) was following in the 
footsteps of Philip Morris (2004) and Japan Tobacco International (2007) in signing an 
agreement with the EU to combat tobacco smuggling.
24
  BAT agreed to pay the EU $200m 
over 20 years to support the agreement.   
The illicit tobacco market is complex, dynamic and rapidly evolving. The constitution of 
illicit tobacco has changed markedly in the last decade from smuggled legally manufactured 
tobacco to counterfeit, „cheap whites‟ and hand rolled tobacco (HRT), with just under half the 
market in HRT in the UK now estimated to be illicit. Evidence also shows that the modus 
operandi of tobacco smugglers evolves in response to enforcement activity by the UK 
authorities and their counterparts overseas. Thus the Programme will not „solve‟ the issue of 
illicit tobacco and will need to continue to evolve over time to ensure continued vigilance and 
activity in this area. In addition, given the established role of the tobacco industry previously 
in the smuggling of illicit tobacco we believe continuing vigilance towards the activities of 
the industry in this area is important. Vigilance is also needed in case the tobacco industry 
seeks to influence how resources are invested across different types of tobacco control 
activity.  During the lifetime of the Programme, there were concerns that IT was being hyped 
by the tobacco industry. One example of this was a BAT video called „Who‟s in Control‟ on 
various tobacco control measures including illicit tobacco which was discussed at one of the 
GB meetings.
25
 Another more recent example is from JTI
26
. 
The recession 
The current economic recession began around the same time as the Programme in 2008/2009 
and hence coincided with the implementation of the Programme.  Disadvantaged 
                                                          
20
 HMRC Tackling tobacco smuggling. 2000 
21
 HMRC New Responses to New Challenges: Reinforcing the Tackling Tobacco Smuggling Strategy,  2006 
22
 HMRC/UKBA Tackling tobacco smuggling together, 2008 
23
 HMRC/UKBA Tackling Tobacco Smuggling – building on our success. 2011 
24
 http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/budget/2010/BAT-Main-Agreement.pdf [accessed 8-11-11] 
25
 http://www.bat.com/group/sites/uk__3mnfen.nsf/vwPagesWebLive/DO89JF9G?opendocument 
26
 Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) report: Big trouble at Big Tobacco is available 
at:   http://www.reportingproject.net/ 
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communities, such as those in parts of the North of England, have been hardest hit by the 
recession as economic hardship particularly affects the more deprived groups in society. 
Unemployment levels are higher in these groups and during the Programme‟s 
implementation, unemployment rates have increased. Overall, the growing economic 
austerity might have been expected to have the effect of drawing tobacco users towards illicit 
sources as other demands on weekly budgets increased, and hence pulling in the opposite 
direction from the aims of the Programme.  
Change in government and subsequent actions 
The change in government in May 2010 impacted the Programme in a number of important 
ways. The main change was that the funding for the regional Department of Health tobacco 
programmes ceased in March 2011 and this clearly threatened the security of the three 
regional tobacco control programmes leading the Programme.   
Another immediate impact of the change in government was as a result of the media spending 
freeze which has been in force since May 2010. This differentially affected the three regions 
involved in the Programme. The regional programmes were set up in different ways and only 
two out of the three had separate NHS collaborative funding and so were able to implement 
the planned marketing campaign of the Programme.  
The government also announced a restructure of the NHS involving the dissolution of 
Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) and the Strategic Health Authorities.  This caused considerable 
uncertainly and disruption to posts at a local level and was commented on regularly in 
stakeholder interviews. For instance, one commented: 
This is the thing you see with the reshuffling and restructuring and cuts and this, that and the 
other, certain key individuals will no longer be in place and therefore where does this work 
go?  [Health] 
Furthermore, the government‟s comprehensive spending review affected local authorities, 
trading standard posts and other local partners who had been involved in the illicit tobacco 
work. As the role of public health is to move into local authorities, it became more important 
to take account of local authorities‟ priorities. For example, one possibility was that structures 
dealing with illicit tobacco and illicit alcohol control might merge in the future so that local 
authorities could continue to support intermediate tier work in this area in a cost effective 
way.  
One thing that we’ve only touched on and there does seem to be varying levels of support for 
it is to make the Programme sustainable, it’s okay so do we for instance think about widening 
out the scope of the Programme to include alcohol?  That I think is a discussion worth having 
because you know if we have to demonstrate greater value for money, plus we know that 
alcohol amongst other products is regularly found certainly on the supply, disruption side   
[Management] 
HMRC had also undergone various changes over the last decade with the development of the 
UKBA (UK Borders Agency) and Inland Detection Teams (IDTs).  During the lifetime of the 
Programme, the government published two tobacco control strategies: the first, published by 
the then Labour government
27
; the second, by the new coalition government
28
. Both 
strategies, however, covered the importance of tackling illicit tobacco and highlighted the 
North of England Programme.   
                                                          
27
 H.M. Government. A Smokefree Future. A comprehensive tobacco control strategy for England. London, 
February 2010. 
28
 H.M Government. Healthy Lives, Healthy People. A tobacco control plan for England. London, March 2011. 
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The potential impact of all the above changes on the Programme was enormous. The 
Programme Manager in March 2011 summarised them in his regular management report to 
the GB thus: 
This report is written at a time of great uncertainty on many fronts within the public sector. 
Organisations supporting this Programme are going through major changes and budget cuts. 
Department of Health funding for the three Smokefree offices involved with the Programme is 
being withdrawn, and local PCT funding, where applicable, is being drastically reduced. Many 
trading standards departments are facing staff reductions, while the remaining members are 
expected to continue to deliver the portfolio of public protection activities. HMRC teams and 
police services are going through their own changes and / or budget reductions.  
National marketing strategy and two pilots  
During February to May 2009, HMRC and DH joined forces with the COI to develop a three 
year marketing strategy to reduce supply and demand of illicit tobacco, based on early 
scoping interviews and desk research and joint strategy development involving a wide range 
of stakeholders. This was published on 24
th
 November 2009. The strategy was apparently 
built around the DH/HMRC budget available for 2009/10 marketing which was £400k, 
although it was indicated that there were opportunities for individual regions to augment the 
proposed activity with their own resources. The categorisation of consumers in this strategy 
built on research carried out in the North of England (see NEMS research section). 
Following this, two pilot campaigns were undertaken in Liverpool and Portsmouth to test 
potential marketing strategies and materials, with the expressed intent of using the results to 
inform future local campaign strategies. The campaigns deployed in Portsmouth and 
Liverpool both used a mix of the same elements:  posters;   leaflets (distributed both door-to-
door and by hand); events; PR; online banner advertisements; bespoke website. While the 
elements making up the two campaigns were the same, their mix and deployment differed, in 
an attempt to meet specific local objectives. 
The Programme Manager reported working closely with Department of Health‟s 
Communications team to ensure alignment with the DH/ HMRC illicit tobacco marketing 
pilots in Liverpool and Portsmouth. The campaigns launched in September/October 2010. It 
should be noted that the creative look for the pilots drew heavily on the Get Some Answers 
campaign developed by the Programme and used the same brand as that campaign (bars 
logo), although delivery was more skewed to face-to face activity and the call to action was 
to call Customs Hotline, or a dedicated website (whereas as discussed below, the Programme 
used Crimestoppers as the principal call to action).  
Pre and post campaign research was undertaken to evaluate the effectiveness of these 
campaigns. An unpublished report describes the findings of these campaigns. The pre-
campaign research observed a higher volume share of illicit tobacco in Portsmouth than 
Liverpool (10% vs 6%) which was reflected in a higher proportion of respondents being 
comfortable with illicit tobacco in Portsmouth than Liverpool. It‟s not possible to say whether 
this difference is due to the presence of the NOE Programme in the Liverpool area as trend 
data are not available but there is no obvious other explanation for these differences.  
The overall impact on the campaigns differed considerably between the two cities with the 
proportion having recently seen, heard or read anything about illicit tobacco increasing by 
14% to 23% in Portsmouth, whilst in Liverpool there was no change. The different results 
were put down to the differing reaches of the two campaigns. Comments by stakeholders in 
our interviews indicated that they perceived the differences in the impact of the two pilots 
were due to the effectiveness of the North of England Programme. For instance: 
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The DH and HMRC produced a marketing strategy with the aim of reducing demand for illegal 
tobacco.  Two pilot sites: one Liverpool and one in Portsmouth so Portsmouth’s in my region 
and they did a whole series of some more usage and attitudes research before they 
developed material for a campaign and we were expecting to be running the same campaigns 
in the two areas but because people’s attitudes in Liverpool were different to people in 
Portsmouth, the campaigns had to be different and in Portsmouth there was still very much a 
lack of awareness of the problem with them not understanding to the same extent the 
seriousness of the problem, really understanding what illegal tobacco was, the crime issues.  
Whereas in the north, in Liverpool because they’ve had this campaign and the Programme 
going it was much more around what to do about it. [External health] 
South of England Illicit Tobacco Programme 
The South of England Illicit Tobacco Programme was launched in February 2011. 
Considerable support was given to the South West and South East regions in the development 
of their materials and in the run up to the Programme launch by the North Of England 
Programme partners. In addition, the South of England coordinator was invited to attend the 
GB meetings. 
Development of Scottish partnerships on Illicit Tobacco  
Although a similar Programme has not yet been launched in Scotland, one of the external 
stakeholders involved in the second round of Stakeholder interviews mentioned how they 
were learning from the North of England Programme in terms of developing similar work in 
Scotland:  
...one of the obvious things is simply the fact that so many people were brought together from  
both the health side of tobacco control and the enforcement side, for the first time to exchange 
information with each other and to learn about the way in which each side works and also get an 
understanding of the different objectives that they work to, so simply that joining up has been a 
really useful thing to see and we’ve looked at that and we’ve started to try and emulate that in 
Scotland, using some of the methodology that the North of England has used to bring people 
together and to ask people to make contributions towards, the development of a policy here in 
Scotland, so we’ve very much mirrored what’s going on there although we don’t have the same 
level of resources committed towards it.  [External health]                                                             
 
(ii) Main Programme activities and process evaluation 
Funding 
The North of England Programme received an initial „pump priming‟ grant of £1 million 
from the Department of Health in 2008/9.  Our understanding is that this funding was divided 
equally between the three regions and it was used over the following two years for the 
following key areas: establishment of core baseline data through the commissioning of 
independent public opinion survey; the development (including consumer insight testing), 
implementation (in NE and NW) and evaluation of an integrated social marketing campaign- 
„Get Some Answers‟, including fee to Crimestoppers; additional regional trading standards 
capacity for both strategic planning and enforcement delivery; dedicated programme 
management support; development and implementation of tailored training packages; running 
of three regional illicit steering groups and the pan-regional GB; and the commissioning of 
this evaluation. Some of these activities are described in more detail below. 
In addition to this pump-priming grant, some localities also dedicated their own resources 
towards addressing illicit tobacco, particularly as the Programme was rolled out and key 
aspects of it became embedded into core local tobacco delivery. Some of these funds came 
specifically from within the local authority or PCT budgets, whereas some came from a 
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specific DH funded „Reducing Health Inequalities Through Tobacco Control (RHITC) 
Programme‟. In addition, there was also additional funding available for regional trading 
standards activity, made available by the DH via the then Local Authority Coordination of 
Regulatory Services (LACORs) body.  
The initial pump-priming grant helped to establish some of the fundamental components to 
the programme, and we understood that as these became embedded, the level of funding 
required to maintain activity was reduced.   HMRC has also had a significant role to play in 
the Programme but their core central funding received for their illicit tobacco focus is not 
described here. The additional funds received by the Programme were not used to fund core 
HMRC delivery.  
Initial activities 
The early part of the Programme was devoted to the very ambitious tasks of developing the 
logic plan and activities, setting up the management infrastructure (the Governance Board) 
and developing the three Regional Steering Groups and other partnerships.  
Concerns of how we will get everybody committed to it, concerns of how we will get it working 
across 3 regions, where each region is quite different and may have different priorities and 
approaches things in different ways  [Health] 
Yes at the moment informal relationships are working but now we are formalising them. We 
are still at the stage where some of them rely on personal relationships, but now working 
towards a structured systematic approach [Local enforcement] 
Website 
The Programme established a website www.illicittobacconorth.org as the central point of 
focus for communicating with the field. For the Get Some Answers campaign, a separate 
website was set up (see below) and a blog. 
Appointing key staff directly and through leveraging other funds 
Appointments of staff at the pan-regional and regional level proved critical in ensuring 
success of the Programme by keeping IT high on the agenda locally. While some Programme 
funds were used directly to make local appointments, as described above, the Programme 
activity in itself contributed to an increase in the number of local and frontline staff devoted 
largely or entirely to illicit tobacco, thereby ensuring improved awareness and enforcement at 
the local level. The Programme also successfully leveraged other funding to support 
additional posts. Examples are given below. As described above, funding was not made 
available to increase HMRC capacity in IT. 
At the pan-regional level, the decision to appoint a Programme manager was made relatively 
late in the planning process. This role proved to be key, however, in ensuring that someone 
was able to dedicate sufficient time to giving presentations, facilitating communication 
between the three regions, negotiating difficulties and raising awareness amongst a wide 
range of potential stakeholders. The importance of having dedicated staff supporting 
partnerships and keeping partners engaged has been pointed out elsewhere
29
  and it has 
certainly proved important in this instance. Without his dedicated support, the Programme 
would not have been able to act in as timely a manner as it has. It would therefore probably 
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 Heckler, S., Russell, A. (2008) Emotional Engagement in Strategic Partnerships: grassroots organising in a 
tobacco control partnership in the North East of England.  Evidence and Policy, 4(4): 331-54. 
 
 22 
 
have lost much of the sense of dynamism and energy that has engaged partners and been 
attractive to stakeholders. 
In each of the three regions, Trading Standards regional level posts were created whose role 
was to coordinate illicit tobacco enforcement across the region. Post-holders were able to 
provide support to localities and, through presentations, communications at meetings and on-
going contacts, ensure that the issue remained on the agenda of local strategic partnerships, 
crime and disorder strategic partnerships, within councils and within trading standards 
departments. These regional staff also ensured that intelligence collected at the national level 
was passed on in a timely fashion to localities in support of raids and other enforcement 
activities. Finally, they also endeavoured to raise awareness of IT amongst magistrates and 
prosecutors in order to ensure that cases were successfully prosecuted and that penalties 
matched the severity of the offence. An example of this is from Smokefree North West which 
in March 2010 set up a specialist Trading Standards NW Illicit Tobacco Team, consisting of 
a manager and two enforcement officers, supported by an intelligence officer.  
Programme partners also helped to secure funding to support local level enforcement officers, 
for instance in the North East, where North East Trading Standards Association (NETSA) 
staff were instrumental in securing Improvement and Development Agency (IDeA) funding 
for local activity. Approximately £50K was used to fund the regional enforcement officer 
post and related areas of activity. Similarly, in Y&H, regional Programme partners ensured 
that a proportion of IDeA funds were dedicated to illicit tobacco enforcement.  
Media Sharing Protocol  
Given the complexity and sensitivity of the issues covered by the Programme as well as the 
number and types of partners involved and the geographical area covered, it was agreed that 
it was necessary to develop a protocol for publicising news and events from the North of 
England Programme. In January 2010, a media sharing protocol was agreed. 
Negotiation of the Closer Working Protocol  
From the outset of the Programme, the partners endeavoured to improve the  means by which 
intelligence could be shared among the partners who needed to act upon it. This was a 
critically important part of the Programme. Although a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) existed between HMRC and LACORS enabling disclosure of information by HMRC 
for the purposes of criminal investigations under Section 19 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001, this was deemed insufficient for tackling the range of intelligence 
emanating from illicit tobacco sales. Programme partners agreed that there would be little 
point in raising the profile of illicit tobacco and increasing the likelihood of people giving 
information on local sellers or users if the information was not subsequently seen to be acted 
upon. In addition, there was the need to streamline operations so that more than one team 
would not try to deal with the same situation: 
And to be honest with you my biggest worry on all of this is what we term in the trade and the 
police use exactly the same as well is ‘blue on blue’. What we are going to end up with if we 
are not very careful  is trading standards take such a route on some intelligence they may 
have and customs going down exactly the same route and us colliding somewhere in the 
middle. And it tends to look terribly unprofessional’ [National enforcement agency] 
 
Signing the new protocol became one of the key challenges in the Programme‟s 
implementation. Although it was referred to earlier in the Programme using other terms, it 
came to be called the „Closer Working‟ protocol. This new protocol, developed to guide how 
intelligence and information on illicit tobacco could be shared between different agencies, 
 23 
 
had been under development for several years before the Programme was launched. 
However, during the Programme, negotiations continued involving a number of Programme 
players. The protocol was referred to throughout much of the evaluation by Programme 
partners and consumed considerable resources and time.  
One of the main issues relating to this was what mechanism should be used as the conduit for 
information about illicit tobacco use in the community. Hitherto the Customs Hotline had 
been utilised. However, there was no mechanism by which Trading Standards officers and 
other local enforcement agencies could routinely access that information and they perceived 
that this “restricted comprehensive intelligence analysis and constrained their ability to 
undertake targeted, proactive and/or reactive enforcement programmes” (TS reports, 
April/May 2009). However, HMRC had serious concerns about transferring protectively 
marked information to Trading Standards officers many of whom did not have secure email 
or other secure systems of communication. HMRC believed that this placed some limitations 
on intelligence sharing. 
A separate meeting was arranged for November 2009 which was organised by HMRC‟s 
„PaceSetter‟ team to which Programme partners were invited. In January 2010, it appeared 
that Trading Standards would be given regular access to HMRC intelligence data subject to 
some legalities and it also seemed likely that regular meetings would be needed to share 
information between the new HMRC Law Enforcement Coordinators (LEC) and a Trading 
Standards tobacco control specialist or Regional Intelligence Officer (RIO). Despite this 
meeting, the new protocol was not resolved. There remained concerns about the access to 
secure email for Trading Standards and the general security of the data. It was felt that giving 
a single point of contact (the RIOs) secure access to the information might be the best 
resolution. Despite ongoing negotiations, informal networks between trading standards and 
members of the IDT were in existence and there were a number of joint TS/HMRC actions in 
the regions. It is also worth noting that the Programme has catalysed closer working between 
TS and HMRC at a regional level both through individual relationships and, in the NW, a 
semi-formal agreement following on from the national protocol. 
Customs Hotline or Crimestoppers 
Other concerns were mentioned in relation to the Customs Hotline such as the willingness of 
the public to use it to report illicit tobacco sales.  
I think the barriers that exist for the public in reporting through revenue and customs hotline 
are still there. And even if you put a neutral non branded front number on, when they get 
through and it is dial 1 for the revenue and customs hotline, I think that might still be a barrier 
for some people to report. So I’m still very concerned about that     [Health] 
If we go down the route of actively publicising this issue and actively seeking information, if 
that information then goes into the national enforcement agency system and then doesn’t find 
its way to us then we will lose the confidence of the people that are supplying that information. 
And if we lose their confidence that would have impacts in a number of other ways as well 
[Local enforcement agency]  
 
In April 2010 the three RTPMs, therefore recommended the use of Crimestoppers instead of 
the Customs Hotline number for the forthcoming social marketing campaign. This decision 
was reported not to have been taken „lightly‟ but made after „protracted and detailed 
discussions to resolve issues regarding the routine transfer of illicit tobacco related 
intelligence between HMRC and local authority trading standards departments‟. There was 
concern that some local authorities were already using alternative lines to the Customs 
Hotline and that a block of 10 local authorities were threatening to make their own 
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arrangements. Crimestoppers had assured the RTPMs „that they had the systems in place to 
share information received with appropriate agencies including HMRC and trading 
standards’. The cost of using Crimestoppers was around £5K. It should be noted that HMRC 
continued to promote the Customs Hotline for IT reporting. This included the two pilots the 
government ran (p17).  Some local authorities also promoted Consumer Direct as a means of 
reporting IT but we have no data on this mechanism.   
It is difficult to evaluate the decision of the GB to use Crimestoppers. As discussed later in 
this report (p19) the NEMS research found that the proportion of people stating that they 
were likely to report someone selling illicit tobacco increased by three percentage points to 
29% during the campaign, suggesting that the advertised channels for reporting were seen as 
appropriate and not a barrier to reporting. In addition, when asked how they would report 
illicit tobacco sellers in the NEMS research in 2011, the most popular answer was the police 
(around 83%), with just under a tenth saying trading standards and only 5%, the Customs 
Hotline.  On the other hand, calls to both Crimestoppers and the Customs Hotline increased 
suggesting that both routes were being used. Finally, however we did not assess the quality of 
the calls received by either helpline as the confidential nature of these calls, precluded us 
from doing so.  
Signing of the Protocol 
Nevertheless, negotiations continued, with involvement of Programme partners and others 
and the Closer Working Protocol was finally signed in June 2011. The Programme partners 
played a highly influential role in bringing the negotiations to resolution. The protocol spells 
out the procedures for sharing information between HMRC and Council Trading Standards 
Services. In particular, it focused on the sharing of information with a particular aim of 
avoiding „blue on blue‟ situations as described above. Given the substantial difficulties in 
negotiating this Protocol, some early expectations about the timescale for implementation and 
impact were unrealistic.  
Balancing Supply and Demand 
Given the protracted nature of the negotiations, inevitably the focus of the early work and 
meetings was how to improve intelligence and data from the Programme on supply. This 
however seemed to disappoint some partners: 
People tend to focus very much on sort of the quantitative type indicators—you want more 
intelligence, more seizures, more prosecutions. And I always turn it around completely the 
opposite way: we want more people to stop buying illicit tobacco, to be concerned that they 
might get caught, to be concerned that if they are selling tobacco in their workplace they risk 
the chance of losing their job, for their friends and family to frown upon the fact that they are 
buying clearly non-duty paid cigarettes…If we continue to get more and more seizures, all 
that is telling us is we still have a massive demand for illicit tobacco. And programmes like 
these are not sustainable in the long term. You cannot continue to invest huge amounts in 
enforcement activities. You have to look for a shift in public behaviour [National enforcement 
agency] 
More discussion on this and the protocol follows throughout this report, but it‟s important to 
reiterate that the programme played an important role in the protocol‟s final form and 
acceptance. 
How do you reduce demand for illicit tobacco? 
Reducing demand for illicit tobacco was a largely new approach and there was no clear 
evidence-base on how to tackle this. The main message that had been used to campaign 
against illicit tobacco – that illicit tobacco was potentially more dangerous and of lower 
quality than regulated tobacco – was a problematic one that risked legitimising regulated 
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tobacco and the tobacco industry, thereby running counter to the highly successful tobacco 
control social de-normalisation agenda.  
Several surveys (including some of the North of England commissioned research) suggested 
that the „greater harms‟ message was complex with a range of contingencies affecting the 
way it was interpreted by target audiences
30
. This was primarily because the majority of illicit 
tobacco smokers believed that their cheap tobacco was not counterfeit or inferior quality. 
They also believed that they could tell the difference and therefore generally avoided tobacco 
which was more harmful in all but the most desperate of occasions.  
The Programme therefore was compelled to find different messages. Initially, this was an 
issue that some of the partners acknowledged, but felt uncertain about how to tackle For 
instance, one Programme partner cited European tobacco smuggling authority Luk Joossens 
in arguing that it was much more difficult trying to reduce demand than supply. Such 
pessimism ran counter to the past record of public health campaigners, who had been highly 
successful at reducing demand for tobacco and other damaging substances through effective 
social marketing. There was also a delay in the implementation of the social marketing 
campaign in order to await  the Department of Health/HMRC‟s national marketing strategy: 
We’ve been waiting for an awfully long time for the DH/HMRC national marketing strategy to 
be finalised [Marketing and Communications] 
‘I think one of the stumbling blocks is that we really want to get going on the communication 
aspect of the initiative. We are waiting for the DH to decide. We don’t want to take forward our 
communication strategy if it doesn’t fit in with what is going to be happening at national level. 
Evidently the DH has been slow in deciding the national communication strategy’ [Health] 
Once the green light had been given to go ahead, another problem arose. The Government 
freeze on media spend nationwide meant that the Y&H region could not implement the public 
facing part of the campaign. Whilst in the NE and the NW local PCT funding for the 
Programme was not affected by the freeze, in Y&H the moratorium by DH on budgets for 
public facing marketing campaigns meant that the region was unable to access the funds to 
execute the social marketing campaign. Y&H only implemented the part of the campaign that 
dealt with stakeholders. 
Get Some Answers social marketing campaign 
The key element of the communications strategy for the Programme was the social marketing 
campaign entitled „Get Some Answers‟ which was therefore run in the NW and NE areas 
only. A social marketing company, The Hub, was hired to conduct research within the target 
audience and, on the basis of the findings and responses, to develop the best forms of 
communication and marketing and the most effective messages for the target population
31
.  
The Programme commissioned The Hub to develop a campaign with two main elements: 1) a 
„public facing‟ element (aimed in particular, at local people who were considered „moveable‟ 
in their attitudes towards illicit tobacco); and 2) a „stakeholder‟ element, for all professionals 
or public figures who might have a role in reducing the supply or demand of IT. Both 
elements were developed following “audience research‟ and discussions with Programme 
partners, and the messages were “finely tuned [...] crafted to connect a specific audience with 
specific issues”32.  One part of the audience research was the NEMS survey described in 
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 Peppermint 2007a, b; NEMS 2008, 2009; ICM 2009 
31The Hub is also commissioned by the DH/HMRC national team to realise aspects of their national strategy 
(DH/HMRC Illicit Tobacco Marketing Strategy). 
32
 Get some Answers Campaign Briefing. 
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more detail in the next section. From this survey, six „attitude clusters‟ were identified 
ranging from „cheap champions‟ who were keen and regular IT buyers to „mothers against 
cheap‟ and „concerned parents‟ (NEMS 2009). The Hub, in developing their marketing 
strategy, decided to focus the campaign on those groups whose attitudes towards IT were not 
ingrained, particularly those people who are slightly uncomfortable with the issue of IT 
already. Their aim was to make these people „more uncomfortable‟ by highlighting the links 
of IT with crime in the local community, with children being able to smoke and smoke more.  
Initial ideas for the campaign were presented to the GB in January 2010 and in-depth pre-
testing was undertaken in various localities across the region in February 2010, resulting in 
the selection of a brand for the campaign that centred around the concept of local people 
„getting some answers‟ to key questions about the consequences of the illicit tobacco trade. 
The words „Illegal Tobacco‟ were chosen over „Dodgy Fags‟ because they were seen as more 
appropriate and conveying severity and there was no potential for misunderstanding or 
misinterpretation. Similarly „keep it out‟ was seen as easier to understand and as more 
powerful than „not welcome here‟ – the words with an image of bars was developed as the 
logo for the campaign. Two main messages were to be developed: illicit tobacco was making 
it easier for children to stop smoking and illicit tobacco was bringing crime into the 
community.  
The campaign ran in June and July 2010 and was undertaken through a range of media 
including a website (www.get-some-answers.co.uk, still current and regularly updated), radio 
advertising and a range of printed media, including newspaper articles (accompanied by 
quotes from local councillors and others) posters, billboards and beer mats.  All these 
materials were accompanied by information to partners and stakeholders about the rationale 
and main objectives of the campaign. Although the weight of the campaigns was similar in 
terms of spend, the larger area and population in the NW meant that the opportunities to 
see/hear would be lower than in the NE.  
Evaluation of the Get Some Answers social marketing campaign 
The GB commissioned an independent evaluation of key elements of the campaign from 
Progressive, a market research company based in Edinburgh and Glasgow. This study aimed 
to measure the effectiveness of the campaign through examining public perceptions via an in-
street survey of the campaign‟s target audience. The survey took place in August and 
September 2010, when the campaign had been in place for several months.  
A fairly equal number of street interviews were achieved in each region (499 in the NW and 
450 in the NE). The survey targeted primarily smokers (80%) those in social class C2DE and 
25-55 year olds. Key findings of the survey were that
33
: 
 The campaign was estimated to have reached three quarters of the target audience in 
NE and over half in NW (just under half of those interviewed) 
 The campaign had an impact in terms of: 
o Raising awareness 
o Shifting stated attitudes 
 The advertising channel with the greatest recall was radio 
 Beermats recalled by similar proportions to posters 
 Respondents indicated that the posters were the most effective at grabbing their 
attention 
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 Progressive (2010) Illicit Tobacco Campaign (North of England) Evaluation: Summary Findings October 
2010, Progessive, Edinburgh.  
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 Differences were identified between the stated attitudes of those who had previously 
seen the campaign and those who had not, and between buyers of illegal tobacco and 
non-buyers: 
 Those who had previously seen the campaign were more likely to agree that the 
campaign had had an impact on their attitudes 
 Illicit tobacco buyers were more entrenched in their views 
 Non-buyers (smokers and non-smokers) stated similar attitudes 
 Attitudes towards illegal tobacco were similar across the two regions 
 The recall of the campaign was higher in the NE 
 NW respondents were more likely to report sales of illegal tobacco  
The evaluation was limited by its sample size and methods and more importantly by the fact 
that the campaign was executed differently in each region and the considerable variation in 
funding allocated to the campaign in each. It is also worth noting that recall of key themes or 
images from the campaign was considerably lower than stated awareness of communication 
around illicit tobacco in general. It may, therefore, be difficult if not impossible, to attribute 
knowledge of the topic directly to the campaign itself. This limitation is further supported by 
the fact that some respondents recalled TV ads on illicit tobacco when TV was not part of the 
campaign, and some images recalled (i.e. raids and ingredients of counterfeit tobacco) were 
not present in the campaign. However, such recall is common in surveys of this nature and 
there was some television reporting of the campaign such as on The One Show and regional 
news programmes.  
Conclusion of evaluation 
The Programme aimed to achieve a reduction in demand for IT through a combination of 
social marketing and outreach to raise the profile of the association of IT use with children 
and criminality within communities, rather than focusing on the message that had hitherto 
been used, that IT was more harmful. The Programme hoped to increase community concern 
about IT and hence reports of its sale and usage which could then be acted on by national and 
local enforcement agencies. 
As long as the limitations of the external evaluation are acknowledged, the campaign does 
appear to have made a positive contribution to raising awareness of the causes and 
consequences of IT in the NW and NE. Additional appraisal of the campaign website 
including the local news articles on the site shows that the materials developed are engaging 
and the key messages are linked to appropriate evidence about the harms and consequences 
of illicit tobacco. In addition, we believe that the impact of the Get Some Answers social 
marketing intervention is best assessed as part of the number of activities that form part of the 
Programme as it is likely that there will be synergy between different elements.  
Uplift/repeat of the Get Some Answers social marketing campaign 
As the first phase of „Get Some Answers‟ tested positively, a second phase was launched in 
January and February 2011, again in the NE and NW regions only, incorporating a more 
direct „call to action,‟ encouraging members of the public to call Crimestoppers in addition to 
finding out more about the issues by logging on to the website. In this campaign, the 
supporting public relations activity highlighted the absence or foreign nature of health 
warnings as being indicative of illicit tobacco and this was positively picked up by the media 
(see for example Fresh SFNE website which has tackled the topic
34
). On this occasion, a 
complaint was made to the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) by a NE ice cream 
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   http://www.freshne.com/News-and-Events/Press/Article/new-warning-over-health-messages-on-illegal-
tobacco 
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company about the creative execution depicting an ice cream vendor selling cigarettes to 
children. The ASA quickly rejected the complaint after Fresh NE provided evidence that 
successful prosecutions have taken place against such offenders. 
Some local areas persisted with the campaign, for example, in March 2011, Tobacco Free 
Lancashire uplifted the 'Get Some Answers Campaign' activity, in recognition of the fact that 
IT was a major problem in their area. The aim was that people should see IT as a problem, 
hear about IT and talk about it in their communities. The short campaign needed to appeal to 
all senses, so the team worked on a four-week local radio campaign so that people could hear 
about the campaign, purchased bus rear advertising so people would recognise the visuals of 
the campaign and they also employed a 'tribe' of social marketing staff to talk to businesses 
and staff at local community centres about IT in their area. 
During the ethnographic research, it was found that almost without exception, health and 
community workers to whom the evaluators spoke said that the Programme has raised their 
awareness about the scope and the significance of the IT Programme in their communities. 
There was occasionally however, some uncertainty about what to do with this raised 
awareness. Some frontline staff were worried about jeopardising the fragile trust that they 
worked hard to establish with their clients. Some felt that the greater harms message was an 
easier message to utilise and were left feeling tentative when it was suggested that this 
message should not be used. Opinions were also occasionally found to be divided about how 
effective criminality messages are at convincing members of the public that illicit tobacco is 
an issue worth acting upon. In general, however, they were willing and eager to help deliver 
the Programme in local communities.  
Toolkit 
Although this is being produced beyond the lifetime of the evaluation, it‟s important to 
mention this particular development of the Programme. The toolkit is intended to be used by 
a variety of partners for tackling IT, learning from the NoE experience. The toolkit will 
highlight strategic and tactical approaches to tackling IT and will cover: developing effective 
partnerships – pan regional, regional and local; generating intelligence and delivering 
enforcement; effective marketing and communications; and assessing progress. The toolkit is 
expected to be launched in spring 2012. 
Community Activation Pilots 
Community activation pilots were also set up to stimulate further dialogue within certain 
communities. The Hub was commissioned to run two community activation pilots, targeted at 
ward level. The areas targeted were Blackpool and Salford, and the Hub worked in 
partnership with NHS groups in those areas. The community action pilot in Blackpool 
focused on pregnant women (where smoking prevalence was high, particularly among 
pregnant teenagers) and the one in Salford, on two groups (routine and manual workers 
employed in a local shopping precinct, and child carers who attend a local „stay and play‟ 
centre). The aim of the pilots was to endeavour to create solutions for IT use with the 
community, rather than the community having a solution imposed on them. The focus was on 
smokefree messages being disseminated through word of mouth by peers. Champions were 
identified and awareness raising exercises were carried out. NHS Blackpool contributed 
additional funding to the Blackpool pilot.  
NHS Stop Smoking Service advisor questionnaires 
During the Programme, the idea arose to try to capture intelligence from NHS Stop smoking 
service advisors gathered during their interactions with clients. There was much discussion 
around this during GB and other partnership meetings because of the sensitivity of acquiring 
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this information and the importance of client confidentiality. A working group was 
established to identify whether this was appropriate and to develop a mechanism for doing so 
based on existing procedures if they existed. This was followed by the Stop Smoking 
Services in the NE and NW trialling a short questionnaire with clients to gather „sort 
intelligence‟ about buying habits, price paid, etc. 
Mentions of NOE Programme in government strategies and other reports 
The Programme was mentioned in several national strategy documents release during the 
evaluation period: 
 Two national tobacco control strategies  
 HMRC/UKBA strategy 
 Included as a priority „serious acquisitive crime in Greater Manchester Against Crime     
Strategy 
 The Programme was also mentioned in the Intellectual Property Crime Report 2009-
10 *IP Crime Group, 2011.  
In addition, GB members were invited to speak at numerous tobacco control conferences in 
England, Wales and Scotland and were selected for a special symposium in the World 
Conference on Tobacco or Health for March 2012. 
Recognition by public sector and public health award schemes 
The work of the Programme has been recognised in several award schemes: 
 The Programme overall was „highly commended‟ in the 2011 North West Public 
Health Awards 
 It was also commended in Public Protection category of the Municipal Journal 
Awards  
 The „Get Some Answers‟ campaign was „highly commended‟ in the not-for-profit 
category of the Northern Marketing Society awards and won Gold awards in the 
Chartered Institute of Public Relations 2011 „Pride‟ events in the North East and 
North West. 
Media coverage 
The Programme has been highly successful in securing media coverage locally, regionally 
and nationally. 
For instance, the first phase of the Get Some Answers campaign in the summer of 2010 
generated almost 150 print, radio, on-line and TV stories in the NE and NW. This had a 
significant „PR value‟ and „advertising equivalent value and generated substantial 
opportunities to see/ hear the key messages. In addition, the Programme sparked an item on 
BBC TV‟s The One Show which has a national audience of approximately 3.5m people – 
The One Show visited the NoE regions. Panorama also covered the illicit tobacco issue and 
had some involvement from the Programme.  
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(iii) Qualitative interviews 
Stakeholder interviews I 
A full report of this part of the research is being written for publication as an academic paper. 
A summary of the key findings is presented here and the findings and relevant quotes are also 
embedded in the remainder of this report.  
 The Programme was seen as exciting and challenging, particularly in terms of what 
multi-agency working could potentially achieve in this important area of public 
health. 
 Stakeholders reported that a great deal of progress had already been made in terms of 
achieving the Programme‟s objectives, with the focus on tackling illicit tobacco 
already having been increased across the region and stakeholder knowledge of the 
issues involved significantly enhanced. 
 Significant strides had also been made in relation to partnership working; in particular 
the Programme was perceived to have enabled a much greater understanding of the 
roles of the different partners involved in illicit tobacco work. However, at the time of 
the interviews the partnerships were not yet perceived to be operating optimally and 
some concerns were voiced about the different philosophies of the agencies and a lack 
of trust between some stakeholders. 
 Nevertheless, there was strong commitment expressed to making the partnership work 
and stakeholders were striving to identify areas where their skills were 
complementary to enhance working relationships. 
 Some stakeholders not represented on the GB (e.g. police forces) had been difficult to 
engage. Efforts were currently focused on engaging these stakeholders as well as 
involving local partnerships in the Programme. 
 Most stakeholders thought the Programme was proceeding well but at the time of the 
interviews in November 2009, it was reaching a critical stage of implementation. This 
hinged on clarifying routes for intelligence sharing and linkages with the national 
joint DH/HMRC marketing and communications strategy on illicit tobacco.  
 Indeed, a main theme permeating the interviews was that of intelligence sharing. At 
the time of the interviews the key mechanism for this was being negotiated and this 
may have therefore had an undue influence on stakeholders‟ views and perhaps also 
meant a predominance of comments were on controlling supply issues (such as 
responding to intelligence to disrupt illicit tobacco becoming available locally), rather 
than demand (such as the social marketing campaign which had not, at the time of the 
interviews been launched). Nevertheless, appropriate and efficient intelligence sharing 
was seen to be essential to the success of the Programme and therefore was believed 
to be a fundamental issue in need of quick resolution. It was apparent that the North 
of England Programme, and particularly the greater understanding of the roles of 
different agencies, and the regular meetings of the Programme partners, had 
facilitated the development of the new „Closer Working‟ protocol. 
 Limited resources, in terms of money, time and people, were seen to be a concern. 
 
Stakeholder interviews II 
A full report of this part of the research is being written for publication as an academic paper.  
A summary of the key findings is presented here and the findings and relevant quotes are also 
embedded in the remainder of this report. 
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 Stakeholders discussed the various ways in which the Programme had raised the 
profile of illicit tobacco in the North of England, among community members but also 
among stakeholders such as Trading Standards partners, the police and national policy 
makers. The difficulties of raising awareness in a segmented market (as per the 
NEMS findings) where messages needed to reach marginalised groups in society were 
noted.  
 In relation to raising the profile of IT, the marketing and communication campaigns 
received many positive mentions.  The majority of participants commended the 
standard of materials that had been produced and that the choice of messages that 
resonated with the public had been notably effective. The importance of avoiding the 
message that IT was more harmful than licit tobacco was also generally applauded. 
 Some stakeholders thought that the Programme had exceeded their expectations, 
whilst others mentioned that given the dearth of evidence in reducing the supply and 
demand of IT, the Programme was probably overly-ambitious in its initial goals. 
 The Programme was perceived to have been very successful in terms of partnership 
building. This had ensured that individuals from a variety of backgrounds and 
professions had a much greater understanding of the perspectives and roles of the 
different agencies involved in curtailing IT, both for those internal to the Programme 
and those external to it. The way partners referred to one another was generally very 
positive although a few isolated concerns remained particularly in relation to how the 
enforcement agencies worked together. Comments were again made about the need 
for greater involvement of the police. 
 Although less of a focus than in the baseline stakeholder interviews, there were many 
mentions of the „Closer working‟ protocol which had still not been signed at the time 
of these interviews. In the absence of this, it appeared that operationally individuals 
were sharing intelligence and as a result enforcement activity was productive, largely 
due to the way positive working relationships had been formed. It was envisaged that 
where these informal relationships worked less well, then the protocol would help 
ensure intelligence was shared appropriately and hopefully ensure that some of the 
Programme‟s positive outcomes could be embedded in the structures and systems for 
future sustainability. However, there was also some indication that expectations about 
the protocol had been tempered, as it was unlikely to ensure access to all HMRC 
intelligence on IT would be shared. The decision to use the Crimestoppers hotline was 
generally favourably discussed. 
 Other assets of the Programme were mentioned as the regional coordination, a 
dedicated Programme Manager and the regional and local networks which enabled a 
much greater sharing of resources and intelligence than hitherto. Other areas were 
emulating the NoE Programme when setting up similar initiatives and it was widely 
recognised that having some summary of the learning from the Programme to be 
disseminated would be very useful. 
 In terms of weaknesses, a few stakeholders commented on the need for a greater focus 
on businesses and penalising employers who allowed IT sales on their premises. The 
tobacco industry‟s role in IT was also thought to have been somewhat neglected, 
perhaps because of the different relationships the key players had with the industry. A 
few stakeholders commented that there were still some remaining issues in terms of 
division of responsibilities across the stakeholder agencies. One external stakeholder 
also wondered whether the success of the Programme in moving IT up the agenda 
might have been to the detriment of other parts of tobacco control. 
 Several threats were identified which could undo the achievements to date, such as the 
challenging economic climate that was thought to result in smokers seeking cheaper 
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tobacco products and the available resources and staff for IT work becoming more 
scarce.  
 Participants therefore spoke about the steps that needed to be undertaken to ensure 
that the profile of illicit tobacco remained prominent in the future, and views 
expressed focused on both supply and demand factors. For example, some stressed the 
continuing need to curtail demand through some continuity of the marketing 
campaign and for regional coordination to continue to ensure cost efficiencies in 
doing this and tackling supply. Others thought that a continuing focus on the supply 
chain and perhaps trying to cut off supplies at an earlier stage of the chain was 
important. Others thought that there might be cost savings if IT work was combined 
with work on reducing illicit alcohol use. 
 If the Programme was to stop immediately, its legacy would remain in terms of 
improved relationships which were likely to be sustained at least in the short term. 
Nevertheless, there were concerns on the health side given the dissolution of the 
regional posts and the movement of public health into local authorities. The biggest 
legacy was likely to be the blueprint the Programme had provided for similar 
programmes in the future. 
 
(iv) Higher level indicators, process and outcome evaluation 
Website hits 
Hits to the two websites used by the Programme (see below) were provided to the evaluation 
team.  Hits on the main Programme website (www.illicittobacconorth.org) totalled 17,578 from 
January  2010 to October 2011 including 12,844 new visitors. For the Get Some Answers 
(www.get-some-answers.co.uk) website which was set up specifically for the GSA campaign, 
there were 16,038 visits from June 2010 to October 2011, including 12,991 new visitors. 
There were 50,833 page views averaging 3.17 pages per visit. Website visitors were greatest 
between July and November 2010 with a small peak in January 2011; these peaks coincided 
broadly with campaign activity although the initial campaign in June and July 2010 had a 
sustained effect for a few months after the campaign stopped. The visits originated in 79 
different countries but with the vast majority from the UK. 
Reducing supply 
A number of indicators were available that could be used to measure the supply of illicit 
tobacco in an area. An inherent problem with each of these indicators was that they were all 
proxy measures as none could directly measure how much illicit tobacco was available. The 
indicators could change simply as a result of the Programme increasing the profile of illicit 
tobacco and its criminality, thus increasing awareness within the community and potentially 
resulting in increased reports of illicit tobacco trading. This needs to be considered when 
assessing the figures below.  
Calls to the Hotlines 
The main call to action by the Programme was to encourage people to call the Crimestoppers 
telephone line if they were aware of any illicit tobacco trading in their area. Hitherto, 
Customs Hotline had been the principal mechanism by which people reported illicit tobacco 
crimes so calls to Crimestoppers is therefore an indicator of the success of the Programme in 
communicating this message as well as being an indicator of local supplies of illicit tobacco 
(note that this does not take account of other sources such as information passed directly to 
Trading Standards).  In order to ensure that we tracked calls to the Helpline resulting from the 
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Programme, we needed to ascertain that they were made from within the region. Individual 
callers to Crimestoppers are not asked to supply their own postcode/address (whereas those to 
Customs Hotline are); for Crimestoppers callers therefore the postcode of the supplier that 
was reported was used as a proxy for this. The number of calls was provided by 
Crimestoppers and the regional Trading Standards representatives but unfortunately historical 
data were not provided so long term trend analysis was not possible.  
Given that the decision to use Crimestoppers was only made in April 2010 and HMRC 
continued to promote Customs Hotline, we have also assessed calls to Customs Hotline 
which had also traditionally been the route for communication around illicit tobacco sales in 
the regions.  
Table 1 Calls to Crimestoppers and Customs Hotline on illicit tobacco 
REGION Jun’ 08-Mar’09 Apr’09-Mar’10 Apr’10-Mar’11 Apr’11-Sep’11 
Postcode CS CH CS CH CS CH CS CH 
North-West         
BB 13 NDA 7 15 37 26 10 16 
BL 5 NDA 6 12 11 23 9 7 
CA 9 NDA 8 16 20 21 4 6 
CH 8 NDA 7 16 15 17 4 9 
CW 1 NDA 2 3 15 14 3 3 
FY 2 NDA 8 6 12 6 6 5 
L 4 NDA 13 22 19 30 11 18 
LA 2 NDA 4 7 7 12 3 6 
M 8 NDA 8 23 28 51 9 30 
OL 5 NDA 2 19 14 23 7 14 
PR 3 NDA 6 7 17 15 10 6 
SK 2 NDA 1 6 9 10 4 5 
WA 10 NDA 5 12 16 14 7 8 
WN 3 NDA 7 11 9 17 7 8 
Total NW 75  84 175 229 279 94 141 
         
North-East         
DH 0 NDA 2 8 14 19 4 5 
DL 2 NDA 0 25 18 25 3 18 
NE 2 NDA 7 54 32 68 0 46 
SR 2 NDA 3 27 15 17 2 10 
TS 7 NDA 4 52 20 49 0 20 
Total NE 13  16 166 99 178 9 99 
         
Yorkshire & Humber         
BD 1 NDA 1 11 0 20 3 13 
DN 6 NDA 8 39 15 50 9 28 
HD 4 NDA 1 9 0 3 2 2 
HG 0 NDA 0 1 0 1 0 3 
HU 2 NDA 1 32 2 28 7 14 
HX 3 NDA 3 4 1 1 2 5 
LS 0 NDA 4 17 1 28 2 17 
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NDA = No Data Available 
The above table shows a clear impact of the GSA campaign on Crimestoppers calls in the NE 
and NW regions particularly for the year April 2010 to March 2011 when the campaign ran. 
There was no increase in Crimestoppers calls in the Y&H region (the number of calls went 
down in the period April 2010 to March 2011 but has increased since this time). The call 
volume has however dropped off over recent months suggesting that the campaign needs to 
be ongoing to have a sustained large effect. Customs Hotline calls have been increasing 
steadily during the evaluation period, with a large increase in the NW. The increased calls 
appear to be sustained over recent months.  
Combining Customs Hotline and Crimestopper calls, the call volume increased dramatically 
from 686 calls from April 2009 to March 2010 to 1046 calls from April 2010 to March 2011, 
the period when the GSA campaign was running. In the six months to September 2011, a 
combined total of 522 calls were received suggesting a sustained year-on-year increase 
overall. As discussed above, we have not done an analysis of the quality of the calls received.  
Seizures 
Whilst HMRC can provide information on fraud and seizures, there was a considerable cost 
attached to retrieving this information and a decision was taken not to utilise these data given 
that most seizures are made offshore, or at some point on the main thoroughfares through the 
UK (Birmingham and East Midlands Airport being notable hubs) and therefore do not give a 
reliable indicator of illicit tobacco availability in the region. 
Local data on prosecutions, interventions, joint operations etc  
Results from the LGA annual tobacco control survey in relation to IT are presented below for 
England, alongside the analysis of regional data from the North of England regions, 
undertaken specifically for this report. All findings reported refer to the financial year 2010-
11. 
Eighty seven per cent of all councils in England were conducting activities in relation to IT 
products. Within the North of England, all but one of the 46 (98% of those releasing data) 
were conducting activities in relation to IT. In England, 74% stated that they had a strategy in 
their region to tackle IT; 45 of the 46 (98%) North of England councils had such a strategy in 
place. 
In terms of complaints and enquiries received, a total of 1,587 were received across England. 
For the 42 councils in the North of England receiving complaints and enquiries, 893 
complaints or enquiries had been received; this represented 56% of the overall  total for 
England.  
Seventy three per cent of all councils in England had undertaken visits with trading standards 
officers to premises in relation to illicit tobacco products; a total of 3,897 visits had been 
achieved. In the North of England, 38 of the 46 (83%) reported visiting premises totalling 
1,450 visits, 37% of the total for England.  Of the visits, across England 72% said that some 
S 3 NDA 13 70 0 71 9 41 
S70 0 NDA 0 0 0 0 1 0 
WKF 1 NDA 1 18 0 21 8 9 
Y 1 NDA 1 11 0 19 1 3 
Total Y&H 21  33 212 19 242 44 135 
TOTAL 109  133 553 347 699 147 375 
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of these resulted from complaints and enquiries, in the North of England this was 84% (32 
out of 38). 
Of the councils in England that reported making visits (110), 84% stated that some visits had 
resulted in the seizure of illicit tobacco products. Among the North of England councils, 87% 
(33 of 38) reported making visits that had resulted in seizures. In England, 81 councils 
reported the number of visits where illicit tobacco products had been seized; this was a total 
of 702. In the North of England, 31 councils reported the number of visits where illicit 
tobacco products had been seized which amounted to 313 (45% of the national total).  This 
means that illicit tobacco was seized in 22% of all visits in the North of England compared 
with 19% nationally. 
Table 2 illustrates the above findings across the three different regions in the North of 
England; this analysis was undertaken from data collected as part of the LGA/DH annual 
tobacco control survey.  
Table 2 Analysis of data from the LGA/DH annual tobacco control survey for the North 
of England by region 
  
Activity North West North East 
Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
Total for the 
North of England 
No of complaints 
and enquiries 
555 117 221 893 
No of visits by 
trading standards 
officers 
950 48 452 1,450 
No visits in 
response to 
complaints and 
enquiries 
167 21 165 353 
No of visits resulting 
in seizures 
204 15 94 313 
Hand Rolling 
Tobacco (HRT) 
smuggled (kgs) 
6,841 15 50,150 57,006 
Cigarette smuggled 
(number of sticks) 
568,085 14,150 247,310 829,545 
HRT counterfeit 
(kgs) 
7,398 108 7,924 15,430 
Cigarettes 
counterfeit (number 
of sticks) 
64,820 6,120 47,700 118,640 
Formal actions 
taken (prosecutions, 
written/verbal 
warnings, simple 
cautions) 
126 8 69 203 
Base 23/23 councils 8/12 councils 15/15 councils 46/50 councils 
 
In England, 63% of councils had carried out joint operations with the HMRC; 87% (40 out of 
46) councils in the North of England had undertaken joint operations with the HMRC.  
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It is difficult to conclude anything definitive from these data without trend analysis 
comparing data in the North of England to the rest of England over time. 
The following surveys give some indication as to the priority that relevant professionals are 
giving illicit tobacco and are therefore indirectly indicative of the focus on reducing supply in 
the area. 
Online stakeholder surveys 
In the online Stakeholder Survey on illicit tobacco, commissioned by the Programme and 
carried out May/June 2009 by Porter Novelli, nearly 500 stakeholders participated (the size of 
the population which was approached was not given) with participants being mostly from 
Health Authorities or Local Authorities. This survey indicated that little time was spent on 
tobacco control, and an even smaller amount of time spent on illicit tobacco. Nevertheless, a 
majority of the participants thought that illicit tobacco posed a significant problem locally. A 
small majority of participants wanted more guidance on dealing with intelligence on illicit 
tobacco, most believing a centralised resource to deal with such intelligence was required.  
From the second survey, 52% of the respondents stated that illicit tobacco had become a 
higher priority in their organisation than it was over a year ago and 85% of these said that this 
was because of the influence of the Programme. 
Increased priority and awareness of IT among stakeholders 
This increased priority was also commented on in the stakeholder interviews. Participants felt 
that the Programme seemed to have raised the profile of certain agencies in relation to 
tackling IT and that this may have resulted in improved working relationships; for instance 
enforcement activity between Trading Standards and the police.  Moreover, knowledge and 
recognition regarding the precise roles and powers held by various agencies may have 
resulted in increased enforcement activity, particularly for those from Trading Standards: 
I think the police have become more aware of our role.  I think, traditionally, they would have 
just thought it was the Customs that would deal with illegal tobacco and, certainly, I’m 
experiencing in [City] that now the police will come to us rather than Customs if they come 
across, you know, if they’re looking for drugs or whatever and they come across illegal 
tobacco in somebody’s house, they’re more inclined to contact us rather than Customs... I 
mean, basically we’ll investigate a complaint and probably go down the prosecution route.                                                                   
[Local enforcement agency] 
Additionally, both internal and external participants spoke about how the Programme had 
raised awareness about the importance of addressing IT and how sophisticated the market 
was among agencies (e.g. stakeholders, tobacco control) and at higher public health and 
policy level; according to some participants this has resulted in pushing forward activity 
tackling IT.  In particular, several participants commented on the way the Programme had 
raised awareness regarding the health impacts of IT among the agencies involved: 
I think successes, they’ve certainly raised the profile of the issue substantially.  Obviously I 
can’t speak for the people in the north of England that live there but from an outside 
perspective I think they’ve raised the issue with the policymakers, with other public health, the 
wider public health community.  It’s certainly become a much more high profile issue and also 
got partnership working going with Customs and Revenue and Trading Standards and really 
just pushed boundaries.     [External health] 
As a result of improved understanding, participants suggested that agencies were more 
engaged in tackling the issue, perhaps in a more organised manner than previously:  
I think the Programme has been very, very good, it’s been excellent in raising awareness of 
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the health issues in relation to illicit tobacco, you know prior to this local authorities or the 
Trading Standards departments, it was very sort of ad-hoc and the extent to which Trading 
Standards got involved with tackling illicit tobacco, it was very much a brand protection issue 
you know occasionally they would get involved with an investigation concerning counterfeit 
tobacco.  It’s really been good in raising the profile, you know that actually it’s a health issue, 
it’s not a brand protection issue so it has been very, very good in that respect.                                                                           
[Local enforcement agency].                  
Trading standards survey 
The questionnaire survey via Trading Standards to Local Area Chief Officers carried out in 
March 2009 yielded 39 responses from an expected 44 responses: 18 from NW, nine from 
NE and 12 from Y&H. Tackling counterfeit tobacco was rated within the top three priorities 
by 80% of respondents, other activities relating to illicit tobacco such as fag houses, 
smuggling, van/car illicit sales, organised crime linked to illicit were lower down the priority 
list for most respondents. Sixty percent of respondents reported that they had dedicated 
resources, the majority being funded through PCTs for specific roles of projects. When asked 
to rate a series of areas that they would like to see improved for future effectiveness of 
tobacco control activities, intelligence, funding and resources were seen as the most 
important areas for improvement.  Five key recommendations were provided: improved inter-
agency intelligence sharing; dedicated funding for tobacco control activities; increased 
partnership working; educating and informing the public; providing training for front line 
staff.  
Reducing demand 
The proportion of people using illicit tobacco is an indicator of demand but also reflects the 
availability and accessibility of illicit tobacco within a locality (emphasising the 
interrelationship between demand and supply measures). Measures of demand are therefore 
also to be treated with some caution and for this reason we recommended that a number of 
different indicators are used. In addition, given the Programme aim to increase the perception 
that the sale of illicit tobacco is a criminal activity, sources other than self-report should be 
used in case the campaign influenced people‟s willingness to self report illicit tobacco use. In 
this case, the only other source that could be used are data from HMRC estimating the market 
share of illicit tobacco use. 
The main source of demand indicators that we used was the NEMS surveys and these are 
described in some detail below.  
NEMS Market research study 2009  
Objectives 
Surveys of smoking behaviour to capture prevalence, type of tobacco used, source of tobacco, 
attitudes to illicit supply, incentives to stop using illicit supply and/or assist with measures to 
prevent others from using, and suggested channels and approaches for communication on 
illicit supply.  
Methods 
Telephone and street interviews, using stratified telephone number sampling (from published 
lists and random generation) and quota interview sampling, to recruit a minimum of 120 
participants aged 14 and over from each of the 49 Local Authority Trading Standards Areas 
in the study regions (North West, North East, Yorkshire & Humberside), carried out in June 
and July 2009.  
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Results35 
A total of 6084 interviews were conducted. Overall smoking prevalence was 23% (2009 
national average 21%). In the past year, 85% of smokers had purchased cigarettes, 21% hand 
rolling tobacco (HRT) and 6% both. Approximately 10% of tobacco was purchased duty free 
and brought home from abroad by smokers themselves (27% of smokers) or by others (32%). 
Over half of all smokers (54%) were aware of, and 20% purchased illicit tobacco other than 
duty-free, with illicit tobacco typically accounting for about a third (36%) of their total 
consumption. Around 19% of illicit tobacco comprised foreign brands not normally found in 
the UK, and 25% was considered by the purchaser to be counterfeit or fake. Awareness and 
purchase of illicit tobacco was most common in the North East region.  
Those who bought illicit tobacco came from all demographic groups, but included a high 
proportion of males from lower socio-economic groups, and young smokers (aged 14-17). 
Illicit tobacco users tended to be heavier smokers (by 2 cigarettes/day); and 64% reported that 
the low price of illicit tobacco made it possible for them to continue smoking. Price and 
convenience of supply were the main motivators for purchase. Sellers of illicit tobacco tended 
to be young, unskilled or unemployed males, individually making around £3000-£3500 per 
year from illicit sales. 
Based on responses to four attitude statements, 
57% of the population were classified as  
“very uncomfortable” with the sale and 
purchase of illicit tobacco, 27% said that they 
would be likely to report someone they 
suspected of selling illicit tobacco, but this 
increased to 76% if sale was to children. 
Classification by attitude responses identified 
six groups (Table), of which three (mothers 
against cheap, concerned parents and conscious 
indifferents) were estimated to account for 
38% of all illicit tobacco purchase and to be 
key target groups for intervention.  
Nearly two-thirds (63%) of adults agreed with the statement „Illicit tobacco brings crime into 
the local community’, 46% of smokers and 31% of purchasers of cheap tobacco.  
The main sources of advice likely to change smoking behaviour were doctors, and close 
family or friends. 
NEMS Market research study 2011  
Objective 
The 2011 survey was carried out with the same objectives as in 2009, and for comparison 
with the 2009 data.  
Methods 
Methods were largely the same as in the 2009 survey, with the following exceptions: that 
Yorkshire & Humberside region was not included in 2011 because funding was not available 
as explained earlier; sampling was weighted to include a relatively high proportion of 
smokers; and in line with changes in ethics policy, interviews with 14-15 year-olds were 
                                                          
35 www.illicittobacconorth.org  
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carried out through sampling in local schools and youth clubs with parental/guardian consent, 
rather than street interviews. The sample therefore included 36 areas also studied in 2009. It 
was carried out in March/April 2011.  
Results 
Interviews were carried out in 4,111 adults (aged 16 and over) and 358 14-15 year olds. 
Overall smoking prevalence was 22% (2 percentage points lower than in the same regions in 
2009). The proportion of smokers who had brought back, or had others bring back, duty-free 
cigarettes from abroad fell substantially, to 27% and 22% respectively. The proportion of 
smokers purchasing illicit tobacco also fell, from 20% to 18% and particularly among young 
smokers, as did the total market share of illicit tobacco, from 9.4% to 8.8%; this fall was 
more marked in the North East than in the North West. Sources of illicit supply were similar 
in the two surveys, with the exception of shops, which increased from 8 to 14% of total. 
There was a reduction in the proportion of counterfeit, and in increase in the number of 
foreign brands. Much illicit purchasing was opportunistic.  
Awareness of illicit tobacco increased from 54% to 69%. The proportion of smokers who 
were comfortable with illicit fell however, by 4 percentage points to 15%, with similar 
reductions recorded in both regions. The proportion „very uncomfortable‟ with illicit tobacco 
rose by four percentage points to 59%. The proportion of people reporting that they were 
likely to report someone selling illicit tobacco increased by around 3 percentage points to 
29%, 76% again reporting that they would report sale to children.  
Among the 14-15 year-old sample, smoking prevalence fell from 32% in 2009 to 19% in 
2011, and average consumption from 11 to 4 cigarettes per day. However, the proportion of 
smokers ever purchasing illicit tobacco increased from 31% to 46%. Over a third (34%) of 
those purchasing illicit tobacco did so from a private address (fag house), a significant 
increase on the 15% in 2009. Purchase prevalence in shops remained similar for this age 
group (22% in 2009 and 25% in 2011). The proportion of this age group that is very 
uncomfortable with illicit purchase increased from 34% to 44%.  
In support of the above findings, stakeholders believed that the programme had significantly 
raised awareness of IT among community members. It was suggested that the Programme 
had gone some way in changing individuals‟ attitudes about IT and had moved people away 
from prior beliefs relating to how interest around the matter was motivated by monetary 
factors, namely financial loss in terms of duty and tax evasion.  Instead, participants spoke 
about how communities were becoming increasingly aware of the impact of IT on their 
children and the wider implications associated with such activity, such as the crime that IT 
activity perpetuated. Increased awareness of illicit tobacco and problems associated with 
illicit tobacco usage was identified in the stakeholder interviews as one of the main legacies 
of the Programme: 
So I think that will be the main legacy, actually people thinking yes, this is a problem, we don’t 
want these gangs in here, these gangs which are involved in illicit tobacco, maybe involved in 
drugs and other criminal activities as well, so I think that would be probably the highlight 
really. Just people being more vigilant and aware and willing to call, hopefully [Health]                                                                                                              
A great deal of awareness raising, very successful awareness raising, particularly relating to 
the contribution to health and how tobacco crime fits in with other criminality’ [Local 
enforcement agency] 
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Further analysis of NEMS data 
In 2011, NEMS were commissioned by the Programme to synthesise and appraise the 
different research projects that they had conducted on illicit tobacco. The data included 
regional studies in seven of the nine English regions and the two pilot evaluations – this 
amounted to over 20K interviews; over 11K with smokers and over 2.5K with illicit tobacco 
buyers. The data suggested that the availability of illicit tobacco (using reports of visibility 
and/or offers) differed markedly between the regions and that there was a strong link between 
this and the amount of illicit tobacco consumed. Among smokers, those in the NE and NW 
stood out as being the most uncomfortable with the issue of illicit tobacco and this had 
increased over the two years of study, with the proportion being „very uncomfortable‟ 
increasing by 9% in both regions. Awareness of illicit tobacco was also highest in the NW 
and NE (using 2011 data for these regions) and in these regions there were also much higher 
proportions of people who recalled seeing, heard or read anything about IT; however 
likelihood of reporting someone was lowest in these regions despite increasing during the 
period of study. 
NEMS used a range of models to quantify the components of change in the North of England 
over the two years of study. Their analysis suggested that for the NW a 2% decrease in the 
proportion of smokers buying illicit could be attributed to the shift in comfort whilst the small 
decline in the average illicit proportion among buyers could be attributed to a small reduction 
in availability. The larger reductions recorded in the NE could be attributed to reductions in 
both comfort and availability.  Radio and local press advertising proved effective in 
increasing opportunities to see, hear or read about the campaign. The authors argued that the 
„causal impact of shifting attitudes is irrefutable‟. We agree that the results appear promising 
but attributing causality is difficult without randomised trials. Hence we believe it is 
important to triangulate these data with other sources.  
HMRC and NEMS estimates of illicit tobacco market share 
The survey combined the prevalence of buyers of illicit tobacco with measures of how much 
of their tobacco use was illicit to calculate a share of the tobacco market which was 
accounted for by illicit tobacco. As discussed above, this estimate decreased slightly over the 
two years (estimated market share 9.4% in 2009, 8.8% in 2011; in the NW, the figures 
remained similar: 7.2% in 2009 and 7.6% in 2011; whereas the market share dropped by 
2.5% in the NE where levels were overall much higher: 15.3% in 2009 to 12.8% in 2011).  
Estimates for the HMRC figures for illicit tobacco market share for manufactured cigarettes 
and roll-your-own are given below. As can be seen the HMRC estimates are considerably 
higher overall – slightly higher for manufactured cigarettes but very much higher for roll-
your-own. NEMS and HMRC use very different methods for calculating the illicit market 
share. HMRC has suggested that there is a risk of subjectivity in the responses to questions 
asking individuals to report their illicit consumption and combined with a tendency for 
individuals to under-report their overall tobacco consumption, has suggested that may 
contribute to under-reporting of illicit consumption in the surveys.  
Overall, both the HMRC and NEMS data show a decrease in the market share for IT during 
the evaluation behavior. The NEMS report shows increasing awareness of illicit tobacco and 
some positive trends emerging in public attitudes and behavior in the North of England 
region.  
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Table 3
36
 
 2005-6 2006-7 2007-8 2008-9 2009-10 
Manufactured 
cigarettes 
16% 15% 14% 13% 10% 
Roll-your-own 60% 56% 50% 50% 46% 
 
Trading Standards young people’s survey in the North West 
Trading Standards North West interviewed 13,902 young people in the region in 2009 and 
showed that illicit tobacco is a significant source for young people. Just over a fifth (22%) 
reported being smokers. This survey found that nearly one in five bought from street sellers, 
vans, neighbours or private houses; 60% had bought packs of cigarettes with health warnings 
in a foreign language, up to 50% reported buying fake cigarettes. There had been a significant 
fall since the 2007 survey in the proportion purchasing cigarettes from off-licences and 
newsagents, which was attributed to the introduction of the law banning sales to under 18s. 
However, those surveyed still cited such shops as one of their main sources of tobacco. 
 
Between January and April 2011, this survey was repeated with a sample of 13,051 14 -17 
year olds from across the North West representing children from 21 North West Local 
Authorities. Although there are some shortcomings with the way the survey was carried out, 
the size of the sample enables comparisons to be made with the previous survey. The 
proportion of 14-17 year olds who identified themselves as smokers had decreased by 4% 
since 2009 (18%) and there had been an 8% increase in the proportion of young people 
claiming to have never tried smoking (54% vs 46% in 2009). Consistent with the previous 
survey most purchased their cigarettes from off licences or newsagents although there had 
been a decline in reported purchases from these sources. The sale of fake cigarettes had 
decreased since 2009 (28% vs 32% in 2009) as had the sale of cigarettes with foreign health 
warnings (50% vs 60% in 2009). 
 
These surveys whilst not representative random samples do indicate a reduction in purchases 
of illicit tobacco and promising reductions in smoking among young people. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Despite the recession and significant disruption and cuts to staff and resources, this pilot 
Programme implemented a variety of activities in accordance with its Action Plan. It should 
be noted however that this innovative and unique pilot Programme, tackling a complex 
region-wide issue, is still at a relatively early stage of implementation and therefore this 
evaluation should be seen in that context.  
Stakeholder interviews showed that partnerships across local, regional and national 
enforcement as well as health and marketing agencies had been developed. During the 
lifetime of the evaluation period, the „Closer Working‟ Protocol was being negotiated and it 
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was not signed until June 2011. During this period however, informal relationships developed 
which enabled many joint operations to take place.  
Stakeholders identified that the programme had increased awareness of IT among relevant 
agencies (both locally and nationally) but had also increased awareness of IT among the 
target audience and impacted favourably on behaviours indicating a reduction in demand for 
IT which was likely to be attributable to the Programme. This was borne out by the NEMS 
market research data. This impact was thought to be sustained at least in the short term: 
And I do genuinely believe that if we did disappear tomorrow, that the level of 
priority this would have at local and regional level is significantly higher than it was 
previously. [Health] 
I think yeah, definitely sustainable impact in terms of people’s awareness and people 
not just the public but us in public health and policy as well.[External health] 
Available indicators also show an increase in intelligence reports to the hotlines during the 
campaign period.  
In terms of moving forward, there were a  few instances where stakeholders felt that altering 
beliefs and attitudes towards IT would remain a challenge and that altering the social norms 
of individuals and communities most likely to use IT would continue to be a challenge. 
I think what you can do is, you can have an impact, you’re much more likely to be 
able to have an impact when the smuggled market share has got down to a certain 
point, at a sort of tipping point where it become denormalised.  And we saw that 
happen, in a very different way, in a way, on smoking in pubs and bars.  Now, I don’t 
think we’re at that tipping point in illicit tobacco, and it’s much more segmented as 
well, so buying illicit tobacco, you know, people like you and me, if we were still 
smoking, we’re unlikely to buy illicit tobacco.  We might, but we’re unlikely to do, 
whereas if you’re poor or young, you’re much more likely to and, therefore, it’s 
segmented as a market, and that makes it more difficult to change attitudes as well, 
because you’re talking about trying to change attitudes within groups who may see 
themselves as marginalised anyway and not part of mainstream society...                           
[External NGO] 
Indeed, several people voiced the need for continued coordination and funding to keep the 
momentum going and continue to impact on joint operations, intelligence sharing and 
influencing attitudes and behaviour. 
If the Programme had been stopped today, obviously there’s always a turnover in 
personnel and eventually you would lose pretty much all the benefits that you had 
accrued through bringing people together, putting in place some of the personal 
contacts to this type of work and the further you went on in time, the less impact 
clearly the Programme would have so I think it would possibly very quickly, you 
would lose a lot of the benefits and any long term impact you might have generated 
from the Programme. [External NGO]                                                                                                                
If it goes, you know and things were to stop, I think there would still be small pockets 
of activity taking place but in terms of pulling it all together, that just wouldn’t 
happen, there wouldn’t be even the person there and it would very quickly fall off the 
radar, that’s sort of my view on you know how things are at the moment. [Local 
enforcement]               
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So as far as I can see the biggest threat is if there’s lack of funding to take this 
forward. [Health] 
In addition, the continuing restructuring of public health will also require vigilance, if the 
partnerships that have been set up are to be maintained: 
If, in the transition of public health to local authorities, if the activities in relation to 
illicit tobacco are embedded within the call of duties to Trading Standards then you 
know some of the work would continue and there would be some partnerships on a 
more informal basis that would continue but you know the formal arrangements that 
have been established, then no I don’t think they would continue.  [Local enforcement 
agency]. 
We’re going to have, at the local level, a ring-fenced Public Health budget but my 
understanding is there will not be a ring-fenced tobacco control budget within the 
Public Health ring-fence and there’s always a danger that people will go and put 
more emphasis on illicit alcohol or drugs or guns or all these other areas and I think 
that’s the key, is how do we ensure that this remains a priority throughout every area 
of the country?  I think that might be very difficult...I think just a lack of funding, a 
lack of momentum, a lack of marketing literature, materials and awareness could 
stop, I guess. [Health] 
The sustainability of the Programme is therefore likely to rest on continued investment to 
enable: regional coordination; regular meetings of stakeholders to enable expertise and 
intelligence to be shared; a sustained social marketing campaign; and progress to be 
monitored. In moving forward, the Programme should continue to assess consumer views. As 
the recession continues, striking the right balance between avoiding a focus on tax losses and 
relative health risks, whilst concentrating on criminality and the influence of IT on children 
will require vigilance. The Programme trialled a new approach to this which appears to have 
had resonance with the target audience and the materials have been utilised and further 
developed by other pilot projects in other areas.  
Even though several threats were outlined that made it difficult to envisage the future of the 
Programme, most participants recognised, as stated above, that it would leave a legacy, 
come what may.  In terms of the Programme itself, participants felt that it had had a positive 
impact, in general.  More detailed discussions indicated that the Programme seemed to have 
improved working relationships, for example between HMRC and Trading Standards. The 
most commonly reported legacy of the Programme was that it had attracted the attention of 
other regions and nations and that it had been mentioned in the Tobacco Control Plan and 
the HMRC Tackling Tobacco Smuggling Strategy Together.  Moreover, examples were 
provided about how the North of England Programme was and should be used as a 
blueprint: 
I would maybe expect – and it has certainly been the case to date – that they would 
share the learning from what’s been going on in the North of England, that they 
would make materials available, would be willing to share pieces of work which they 
have done.  So we’ve been able to adapt the action plan, we’ve adapted the usage 
and attitudes survey.  I don’t know about the materials for the advertising campaign 
because we’re not there yet so I haven’t had to ask them about those yet.  But 
certainly we are able to use their learning to develop our own programme which I 
say has been working well; to date we’ve been doing that.  [External health] 
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In conclusion, illicit tobacco remains a serious and significant 'upstream' problem affecting 
health inequalities in countries worldwide.  There is also evidence of continued collusion in 
illicit tobacco by the tobacco industry
37
. The Programme offers a blueprint for regional 
initiatives to reduce both the supply and demand for illicit tobacco, and is an exemplar of 
partnership working. It has shown great promise in terms of finding impactful consumer 
messages about the harmfulness of IT to communities, raising awareness of the issue, 
increasing intelligence and changing behaviours and therefore deserves to be widely 
disseminated. 
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